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Friedrich Nietzsche, 100 years after his death, remains a controversial figure in philosophy. 
Much of this controversy stems from Nietzsche's view of truth, which seems superficially 
hopelessly contradictory, vacillating between relativism and denial of truth on the one hand, and
 
praise for science and “hard truths” on the other. Thus, any person wanting to defend Nietzsche's
 
positive philosophy must first make sense of his epistemology. The solution to this puzzle 
regarding Nietzsche's theory of truth  is the realization that Nietzsche changes his view on truth.
 
Much like Wittgenstien, Nietzsche had an early and a late period in his epistemic views, and a
 
middle period where he is struggling with two very different, incompatible views. The late view
 
of truth is surprisingly straightforward: Nietzsche can be seen as an early pragmatist. Once we
 
have a coherent truth theory, we can then start to conclude some of the more contentious 
arguments in Nietzsche's philosophy, such as: what is the Will to Power, and how does 
Nietzsche's view of truth interact with his criticism of morality? This thesis will  trace the 
development of the former and endeavor to answer some of the latter. 
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A note on citations: works by Nietzsche are cited by section, not by page number, and particular
 
works are referred to by their first letters. For example, Beyond Good and Evil would be written
 
as BGE, (page number). Occasionally, there will be section numbers with the name of a section
 
after them. For example, EH (Ecce Homo) The Birth of Tragedy 3. This is because in Twilight of
 
the Idols and  Ecce Homo   Nietzsche abandons his  more familiar  formating,  and has named
 
sections  with  numbered  subsections  within  it.  Thus,  noting  something  as  EH  7  would  be
 
ambiguous, as there are many 'seven' sections in Ecce Homo.
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What are man's truths ultimately? Merely his irrefutable errors.
(The Gay Science, Section 265)
Chapter 1  
Early Nietzsche on Truth
Of the debates surrounding Nietzsche scholarship, none are as acrimonious (or as 
important) as that over Nietzsche's theory of truth. The reason is simple: if Nietzsche’s theory of 
truth is to be identified with everything he wrote on the subject, then his view of truth is well 
nigh incoherent. In some texts he seems to take the accepted view of truth by valuing it in both 
philosophical and scientific cases.  Specific remarks supporting this commonplace view of truth 
are found throughout Nietzsche’s work: “It is in the final analysis the sense for facts that is the 
mark of the higher culture” (Human, All Too Human 2). Similarly, he writes, “Knowledge, 
saying yes to reality, is just as necessary for the strong as cowardice and the flight from reality—
as the ideal for the weak, who are inspired by weakness” (Ecce Homo, The Birth of Tragedy 2). 
As for mankind's often confused thinking on metaphysics and morality, Nietzsche says, “The 
Steady and Arduous progress of science, which will ultimately celebrate its greatest triumph in 
an ontology of thought, will deal decisively with these views” (HATH, 16). We can see in these 
quotations Nietzsche appealing to our ordinary conception of truth, and praising those who “have 
trained themselves to sacrifice all desirability to truth, every truth, even plain, harsh, ugly, 
repellent, unchristian, immoral truth. ---For such truths do exist…” (Genealogy of Morals 1).
At other times, and even in the same texts, Nietzsche appears completely skeptical of 
truth by denying that we could have access to anything like truth or certainty, and by asserting 
that we live in a psychologically constructed, thoroughly fictitious world. Nietzsche contends 
that “the world is not our idea, the laws of numbers are completely inapplicable: they are valid 
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only in a human world” (HATH 19), and he asks, “What are man's truths ultimately? Merely his 
irrefutable errors.” (Gay Science 265). He further declares that “truths are illusions we have 
forgotten are illusions” (Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense  84)  and that “without a 
constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live--that renouncing 
false judgments would mean renouncing life and a denial of life” (Beyond Good and Evil 4). 
Nietzsche also wrote that science keeps us in a “suitably artificial, suitably constructed, and 
suitably falsified world” (BGE 24). Nietzsche appears in these statements to think that no 
statement can ever be true in the everyday sense; at some level, there is a falsification. 
Given these and the many other remarks Nietzsche made concerning truth, it is difficult 
to see how these remarks could avoid contradicting one another. His apparent dual view of truth 
is a difficult problem for any philosopher, especially given that the basic standard of 
acceptability in any philosophical tradition is logical consistency. For the Nietzsche scholar, in 
particular, this problem casts doubt on many of Nietzsche's larger projects. For example, 
Nietzsche’s criticism of morality is based on it being true that, at one point, there was a slave 
resentment in morals which was formed out of the opposite ideals of the conqueror as an act of 
vengeance against them. Without the commonplace sense of truth, we have difficulty seeing why 
we should take these ideas seriously. Indeed, it is questionable why we would take anything 
Nietzsche says seriously when he has appears to have such basic consistency problems. 
There are two ways of overcoming these apparent inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s account 
of truth; we can either show that a contradiction does not exist (a procedure I will call the 
conventional strategy) or show that Nietzsche is writing both intentionally and coherently. The 
conventional strategy relies on taking Nietzsche’s skeptical statements and arguing either that 
they are restricted to a certain domain or that they are not the straightforward denials of truth 
they appear to be. Both variations on this approach ultimately want to emphasize Nietzsche's 
conventional statements, casting him as a conventional philosopher on the subject of truth. The 
radical interpreter will, on the other hand, take Nietzsche’s skeptical statements on truth as they 
are, even privileging them over Nietzsche’s more conventional statements on truth. The light the 
radical interpreter wants to cast is that Nietzsche intentionally endorses his skeptical statements 
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on truth, and this deliberation either trumps his more conventional statements or somehow results 
in a different coherence. Both strategies rely on reading Nietzsche as a unitary whole with a 
consistent idea about truth from the beginning of his early period to the end of his late period.1 
Although both strategies fail to render Nietzsche coherent on truth, an examination of 
them will be useful in showing us what problems a successful account must avoid. My position 
in this thesis is that Nietzsche ultimately has a coherent theory of truth, but to understand it, we 
must abandon the assumption that Nietzsche's view of truth is consistent and unchanging 
throughout his philosophical career. Given my central position, my thesis will not defend critical 
writings that present Nietzsche’s account of truth as incoherent nor will it defend accounts that 
assume Nietzsche had a unitary position on truth. As our examination will show, the former must 
be rejected if we are to have any sort of respect for Nietzsche as a philosopher, and the latter 
must be rejected because it leads to the former. More crucially, evidence shows that Nietzsche 
changed his mind on fundamentally relevant metaphysical theses, and that these changes lead to 
a satisfactory theory of truth in his later works; consequently, a developmental account of 
Nietzsche's view of truth is both plausible and leads to a satisfactory final position on truth.
Walter Kaufmann is a prominent proponent of the conventional strategy.  Kaufmann 
always treats Nietzsche’s work as a unitary whole, and when faced with Nietzsche’s early denial 
of truth, his strategy is to say that denials of truth in early Nietzsche are restricted to criticism of 
very specific types of truth, namely metaphysical truth. Kaufmann correctly points out that 
Nietzsche was a fierce critic of metaphysics and believed all ideas derived from such ended in 
error. On Kaufmann’s account, Nietzsche considers metaphysics to be any value or deduction 
that came not from this world, but from another, more perfect world, such as Socrates' world of 
1Nietzsche's early period starts with the Birth of Tragedy (1872) and the publishing of Untimely Meditations 
(1873-76), and includes his unpublished essay Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense (1873). Human, All Too 
Human (1878) opens Nietzsche's middle period, and includes The Dawn, (1881) The Gay Science,(1882) and Thus 
Spoke Zarathrustra.(1885) Nietzsche's late period stretches from Beyond Good and Evil (1886) to the end of his 
writing career. The early period is characterized by a radical skepticism; the middle is a mix of skepticism and 
respect for science (and the conventional notion of truth generally.)  The late period is characterized by a respect for 
science and truth, with none of the skepticism of Nietzsche's earlier periods. 
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the forms. Thus, on Kaufmann’s account, Nietzsche’s statements such as his “Truths are illusions 
that we have forgotten are illusions” are seen as a critique of metaphysical ideals and not as a 
criticism of empirical truth. Kaufmann's position on Nietzsche is that while Nietzsche thought no 
metaphysical claims are true, many empirical claims are. By recasting Nietzsche's criticisms of 
truth as criticisms of metaphysical truth, Kaufmann makes Nietzsche into a conventional 
philosopher, one concerned with exposing untrue beliefs. For example, Nietzsche’s critique of 
religion is seen, at root, as a criticism of untrue beliefs, a set of beliefs that developed from a 
human, all too human, cause.  Kaufmann also emphasizes Nietzsche’s commitment to truth, 
(now understood not as a commitment to metaphysical truth but as a commitment to an ordinary 
kind) saying, for example, “Nietzsche was a fanatical seeker of truth and would accept no value 
above intellectual integrity” (Kaufmann 26). 
When interpreting Nietzsche, Kaufmann always emphasizes the primacy of the published 
texts over the Nachlass. This emphasis lessens considerably the problem of Nietzsche's 
contradictory statements on truth because many of the more controversial statements are made in 
the Nachlass.  Furthermore, BGE, a middle work, is the very last book in which Nietzsche makes 
skeptical statements about truth.  This makes the interpretation of the problem of truth much 
easier for Kaufmann than for radical interpreters, since many of Nietzsche’s most troublesome 
statements are in the Nachless. With this distinction, Kaufmann can dismiss many remarks to the 
status of having occurred ‘in the Nachlass’. Such remarks might be interesting, but they are not 
ones that Kaufmann must incorporate into his discussion of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 2
An advantage of the conventional approach is that most of Nietzsche's criticisms (such as 
his criticism of morality and religion) become claims about how such things were created, 
namely, created by humanity. The criticism of morality, then, is that morality is not true, at least 
2 Kaufmann disagrees with some interpreters of Nietzsche who treat the Nachlass as equivalent to the published 
works.  It’s not that Kaufmann doesn’t think the Nachlass is useful; he thinks it is a great resource for understanding 
Nietzsche’s thinking and how he arrived at the conclusions of his published works. Yet Kaufmann does not like it 
when people treat the Nachlass as equivalent to published works. Kaufmann believes that if Nietzsche had thought 
so much of a given statement, he would have said it in his published works in a more polished form. Radical 
interpreters, by contrast, take the Nachlass to be equivalent, sometimes even superior to, the published works. 
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not in the big “O” sense of objective truth that morality assumes. But to make this strategy work, 
Kaufmann must also give an account of such Nietzschean doctrines as the Will to Power and the 
Eternal Recurrence, which appear to fit this pattern because these doctrines certainly appear to 
be metaphysical.  Kaufmann’s position is to deny their metaphysical nature and say that these are 
empirical claims about reality. For example, The Will to Power is, for Kaufmann, the underlying 
interpretation of all human action in that all human action is motivated by the pursuit of power. 
The Eternal Recurrence is recast as an attempt by Nietzsche to create a new value, a counter-
force to the life-devaluing interpretation of the aesthetic ideal. On the traditional Christian 
religious view, one lives in the service of another world, such as heaven, and Nietzsche saw this 
as devaluing life. The religious view holds that life is a painful, flawed thing to be put up with 
until one can get to the next one.   The Eternal Recurrence, on the other hand, is an attempt to 
affirm this life by saying that one should live this life as though one will repeat the same actions 
again eternally. The purpose of the Eternal Recurrence is to wean us off the idea of the other 
world so that we can learn to embrace and value the experiences of this life. 
According to Kaufmann, the Eternal Recurrence is meant to be more than merely life-
affirming: “[the Eternal Recurrence] was not meant to be a noble lie...on the contrary, Nietzsche 
thought it was the most scientific of all possible hypotheses” (Kaufmann 281).  In addition to 
being a psychological principle and a way to cure those who live their lives for an eternal reward, 
Kaufmann presents the Eternal Recurrence as a statement about the nature of the universe, where 
a finite amount of space and energy combined with an infinite amount of time are bound to see 
everything reoccur. The action one takes now will literally happen again, over and over, for 
eternity. 
For several reasons, Kaufmann’s conventional interpretation has been thrown into doubt 
in recent years. First, and most importantly, it is simply wrong to say that all of Nietzsche’s early 
statements criticizing truth are directed toward metaphysics. Nietzsche regularly describes 
scientific truth as ending in self-contradiction and even contends that basic statements about the 
world are unacceptable anthropomorphisms. Nietzsche “appears to deny that there are even any 
things and to insist that all of our so called truths are therefore really illusions since they 
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presuppose, state, or imply the existence of things” (Clark 6). In the Gay Science, Nietzsche 
states, “It is even less the opposition of “thing-in-itself” and appearance; for we do not “know” 
nearly enough to be entitled to any such distinction. We simply lack any organ for knowledge” 
(GS  354). In Beyond Good and Evil, he says, “science at its best seeks most to keep us in this 
simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably constructed and suitably falsified world” (BGE 24). In 
the Birth of Tragedy, this radical skepticism is even more prevalent. Here, science is seen as 
undermining its own foundations by revealing through its pursuit of truth that it possesses no 
truth at all. The scientific theory was moving toward “biting off its own tail” through its own 
rigorous scientific methods, by demonstrating that it didn’t connect with the objective world. The 
importance of art in Birth of Tragedy underlines this suspicion of scientific claims to truth. In a 
world where everything is false and illusory, art is the only honest thing; it, too, is an illusion but 
is honest in its deception. The arts are contrasted with a supposed reality which tries to conceal 
the underlying metaphor and illusion rooted in all things.
Secondly, if Nietzschean doctrines are straightforward statements about reality, as the 
conventional interpretation takes them to be, it becomes difficult to see how Nietzsche’s own 
statements are not metaphysical. For example, on Kaufmann’s account of Eternal Recurrence, it 
is difficult to see both why the universe repeating itself should ultimately matter to those who 
will unknowingly repeat the same things eternally and how Nietzsche could have any empirical 
evidence of this. Furthermore, Kaufmann’s explanation of the Will to Power as the underlying 
fundamental motivation of all human activity leaves the reader asking exactly what it explains. 
Motives must be contrasted with each other if we are to make basic sense of what those motives 
are referring to. If everybody is always acting on the same motive (such as power), then nothing 
has been explained, since the motive “lust for power” explains all human behaviour. For 
example, we might say ‘he acted out of resentment’ as opposed to ‘he acted out of a deep 
concern’. Without this contrasting aspect, we can't understand motive. By reducing all motive to 
one motive, Kaufmann has rendered his explanation Will to Power meaningless because it 
doesn't explain anything. 
These and other problems for Kaufmann (and the conventional interpretation) are 
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intractable.  Although Kaufmann tries to combine all Nietzsche’s published writings, his result is 
having Nietzsche's earlier claims grievously conflict with later claims. By trying to deal with 
Nietzsche’s truth theory as a unitary whole rather than seeing it as a slowly developing position, 
Kaufmann cannot satisfactorily deal with Nietzsche’s complex relation to truth.
Another conventional interpreter of Nietzsche is Martin Heidegger, of whom I will say 
little, save that Heidegger appears perfectly comfortable with Nietzsche being contradictory on 
truth.  Heidegger acknowledges Nietzsche as the great critic of metaphysics but contends that, in 
the end, Nietzsche could not escape its influence, rendering his view on truth incoherent. Thus, a 
doctrine like the Will to Power or the Eternal Recurrence is, for Heidegger, a conventional 
metaphysical statement on what is essence. A contradiction inevitably results, according to 
Heidegger, due to Nietzsche’s conception of truth as a metaphysical correspondence to objects. 
Heidegger’s position is that the contradiction in Nietzsche's account of truth is there; Nietzsche 
got caught up in the metaphysics of his subject even as he sought to deny it. Heidegger thus sees 
Nietzsche’s position as a crowning failure of the metaphysical tradition going back as far as 
Descartes, and sees the nihilism it seeks to overcome as the inevitable result of the Western 
Philosophical Tradition. The contradiction of truth in Nietzsche appears as the logical end point 
in this process. This view is satisfactory for Heidegger as it makes Nietzsche a stepping stone to 
a new, Heideggerian post-metaphysical standpoint.  However, if we want to understand 
Nietzsche’s view, and not understand Nietzsche's view as a jumping off point to understnading 
Heidegger, then this view of Nietzsche is unconvincing.
Given that Kaufmann’s conventional view makes Nietzsche inconsistent and that 
Heidegger’s view invites us to think the contradiction in Nietzsche exists and is the end result of 
metaphysics, no wonder alternative views have been sought. As we will see, Nietzsche’s more 
radical interpreters, instead of downplaying the seemingly contradictory statements on truth, 
embrace and try to weave a coherent philosophy from them. 
Arthur Danto is a good example of the radical new approach. Instead of trying to avoid 
skepticism on truth, he embraces it. For Danto’s Nietzsche, quite simply truth does not exist and 
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can never exist; that we have such a concept comes first as a product of our animal intelligence 
(that is, the basic concepts that evolution has given creatures like us for communication and 
moving around the world3 )  and later, as a product of metaphysics. Though useful, neither 
commonsense truths nor metaphysical contructions can be true, though both can be elaborated 
upon.  In addition to not being true, concepts like truth (in the commonsense or scientific use of 
the term) cannot be refuted because it is impossible to picture the world without these useful 
concepts. 
An example of Nietzsche discrediting animal intelligence can be found in GS 354. Here, 
Nietzsche discusses how consciousness is caused by a need for communication and notes that 
concepts must be uniform if they are to be communicated. Since making an experience uniform 
strips away the uniqueness of the individual's experience, the concepts we communicate must 
necessarily be falsified from the individual’s experience of them. We cannot reject this 
consciousness-falsification since to do so would be rejecting consciousness itself. On Danto’s 
reading, we are thus hampered by our animal intelligence in that such intelligence developed 
with utility rather than truth in mind. Because what we call truths are conditioned by these 
biological interests (among other human, all too human) interests, it becomes impossible for us 
to know anything non-subjectively. Nietzsche, in TL, asks, “how [we] could…dare say ‘the stone 
is hard’, as if ‘hard’ were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective 
stimulation” (82). Danto reads all of Nietzsche as reiterating the point that because our interests 
are developed by evolution, we could never know things unconditionally, even in theory; rather, 
we can only know anthropomorphizations and falsifications. 
All philosophy (particularly Nietzsche’s), according to Danto, has less to do with the 
truth or falsity of a given statement or doctrine, and more with providing a ‘truth’ in opposition, 
one that is just as illusory as the ‘truth’ it counters: “Philosophers can only oppose them 
(aesthetic and moral truths) with metaphysical illusions (at bottom just as untruthful.)” (Danto 
68).4 Thus, on Danto’s reading of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, truth becomes merely 
3 See Truth and Lie, p 80.
4 This contention makes Danto’s philosophical project of opposing the standard reading of the concept of truth, the 
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humanity's irrefutable errors, beliefs which due to the nature of our minds as dictated by 
evolution, cannot be denied. Our concepts may correspond with other concepts, but none are 
connected with reality. In short, Danto offers an “error theory” of truth – concepts of truth make 
sense of a sort but are all false.
An illustration of Danto’s claim about truth can be found in his idea that the common 
sense view of the world is itself a metaphysical construction, in Danto’s sense of ‘metaphysical’ 
as a non-truth based construction, based upon the assumptions of “animal intelligence.” 
Although metaphysical, no argument could possibly undermine this construction. The common, 
everyday world is only to be thought of as an achievement of the human mind, not as the world 
in which people find themselves. We are, however, unable to reject this world or propose a better 
model for reasons already given; as a result, “In the interests of life and of survival, we are 
constrained to affirm the body of beliefs which passes for common sense and reject whatever 
conflicts with this” (Danto 73-74).5
The reader may ask why science and metaphysics cannot overcome the natural 
falsification of the senses. Danto has Nietzsche’s skepticism continue with a denial of science, 
stating that even science, including logic, mathematics and other, more formal, sciences, “rested 
on errors, accepting, (as it had to) fictions which it took for truths and metaphors which it held as 
reading that holds truth as doing do useful work, corresponding to things, etc..
5 This understanding of Nietzsche makes clear why Danto characterizes Nietzsche's philosophy as a “Philosophy of 
Nihilism,” even when Nietzsche considered Nihilism his most implacable foe. Nihilism was often defined by 
Nietzsche as the belief that the only rational position was to believe in nothing; in Danto’s case, it is the belief that 
there are no true statements about the world even though Nietzsche was more worried about the death of aesthetic 
values and the attendant rise in what we will call value Nihilism. 
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description” (Danto 71). On Danto’s reading of Nietzsche, the idea that “science tells the only 
truths much less tells the truth at all, is a naiveté” (Danto 71). Science, like the other forms of 
truth already discussed, is based on irrefutable fictions and cannot be disproven. Though science 
can make clearer or even create more variations of the constructed human world, it never 
describes the world as it is because science, too, must premise ‘fictions’ that are nonetheless 
irrefutable. Because science can never break out of the mode of inherent falsification, like the 
common sense view of the world it can never make the connection with the thing in itself. In 
short, Danto briefly characterizes Nietzsche’s ultimate opinion of science: “Nietzsche endorses 
science, as long as it does not credit itself with having done more than is actually achieved. For 
example, discovering the truth. It has not done that. For there is none to discover” (Danto 93).
This sketch of Nietzsche’s skepticism about truth found in Danto’s discussion of science 
carries over to the problems of philosophy, as well. Since finding the truth of matters is officially 
off the table, what did Nietzsche, the philosopher, think of philosophy? Danto sees Nietzsche’s 
genealogy6 as providing the answer. By doing genealogy (as Nietzsche frequently did throughout 
his work on, for example, Christianity and morality) the philosopher’s job becomes uncovering 
the human causes of disagreements7 and exposing at bottom the falsity of the philosophy's 
premises under examination:  “Once this is clear, it no longer seems interesting or important to 
try to solve the problem on its own terms” (Danto 70).  Danto thinks genealogy was not only 
Nietzsche’s way of unearthing the interests and assumptions of ‘objective’ truth like morality, but 
6 Genealogy is Nietzsche's term for tracing [?] the history of a idea, “Genealogy of Morals” being a good example. 
Genealogy is important to his philosophy for the act of uncovering the historical roots of various ‘objective’ ideas 
undermines the objective idea's authority.
7 Here, we might think of disagreements such as a Utilitarian and a Kantian disagreeing as to what action is to be 
valued or disagreements about the place of firearms in modern society, and so on.  
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also shows how Nietzsche thought genealogy unearthed the essential falsity of truth (that is, of 
our concepts).8
Danto’s account of Nietzsche does not hold up to examination. One problem can be seen 
in the way Danto tries to deal with a basic question about his account of Nietzsche: If nothing is 
true, then why should philosophers say, recognize that proper philosophy is genealogy? To put it 
another way, why should we accept doing X instead of Y if both are equally fictional? Danto, in 
order to argue anything at all (viz: why we should accept his reading of Nietzsche) needs some 
sort of alternative valuation, one that gives us a reason for choosing one thing over another.  The 
new valuation Danto posits is that one option is more valuable than another to the development 
of life: “P is true and Q is false if P works and Q does not” (Danto 72). The positing of a new 
valuation aside from truth on which to prefer judgments is a move frequently made by radical 
interpreters, but just as frequently, this move runs into trouble.  Generally, in setting up a new 
valuation, radical interpreters typically let truth in through a back door; in order to set up the new 
valuation, they will assume at least one implicit truth in order to establish a proper valuation. 
In Danto’s case, truth re-enters the equation through the vague use of the term ‘work’. Is 
“P works” a true statement? It can’t be, because Danto’s project is to deny truth. Then what do 
we say about “P works”? If it is not true that P works, does that mean that P doesn't work? If 
Danto wants to adhere to the works valuation, do we say that “‘P works’ works?” That doesn't 
solve our problem: it just begs the question of what we mean by ‘work’. ‘Work’ cannot mean 
internal consistency because, by Danto’s account, we already have a coherent, internally 
consistent account. Note that Nietzsche, on Danto’s account, never denies that logic, for 
8 This makes Danto’s  position a little like that of Wittgenstein, who thought some philosophical questions were 
basically nonsense that should be dissolved instead of argued or solved. 
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example, is internally consistent; logic is just an anthropomorphization and falsification of the 
real world.  If “works” is defined as satisfying our interests (‘interests’ being another vague 
term), then it is true that P satisfies our interests by working and Q does not. If “works” is 
defined as working in the world, then it is true that something works in the world.9 The “works” 
problem is similar to the truth problem—either Danto is making true statements about “P 
working” in some sense, or else “P working” is another illusion we cannot reject, which leaves 
us with the question why we should choose P and not Q on Danto’s account. 
Danto tries to avoid these problems by contending that nothing can overcome the 
metaphysics of language; because we are stuck with the language and logic evolution has given 
us, contradictions and other problems are bound to happen.  His is a weak defence, especially 
when his attempt to explain an alternate valuation implicitly buys into the truth he seeks to deny 
and is based upon arguments, presumably coherent, made by Nietzsche. If you want to say “P 
works” in your new valuation of truth, you must explain how your valuation does not endorse 
9 A more modern attempt at getting around this problem is to say we pick a theory based on its psychological utility, 
as theories of truth have a certain utility to them, though ultimately it is the psychological utility of such a notion 
that has kept any particular theory of truth around. This does avoid the problem of how we might understand the 
statement “it is true such a thing is useful to us” because the psychological utility does not necessarily correspond to 
reality. However, there are two major problems with this view.  Firstly, if this theory of psychological utility is to 
replace more conventional truth theories, then it must assume that there is no truth; otherwise, it becomes merely a 
theory of human behavior and thereby not good enough for those who argue that the truth does not exist. If truth 
does exist, then at least some decisions made by some people are decided by truth and facts rather than by 
psychological utility. So this theory must assume what it sets out to prove - that there is no truth - and thus fails due 
to the circular nature of the argument. Secondly, if we all make decisions based purely on psychological utility, then 
it is true that we do this; thus, there is at least one truth after all.  This attempt at a solution does not remove the 
problem of truth for the radical interpreter; it merely moves it around. In other words, any discussion that involves 
an assertion necessarily presupposes truth.  
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that “old metaphysics” you want to criticize and still make minimal sense. You can’t have both 
“P works” and “P is an illusion” because the pairing violates the most basic standards of logical 
consistency. Danto, if he were true to his ideals, would have to face an even more absurd 
problem. If it were true that the innate structures of our minds did falsify reality, then the notion 
of what the reality of a given situation is would be completely incoherent and unintelligible to us. 
This would make talk about reality pointless, especially talk of better or truer valuations. Thus 
Danto would have to admit that there could be no argument, indeed, no reason, why anybody 
would adopt his viewpoint since clearly it lies outside human understanding, and no argument 
about that understanding could penetrate that web of ignorance we have woven for ourselves. 
Danto’s theory of truth encounters another problem. Nietzsche's philosophy clearly is not 
just a negative deconstruction of truth; he also has doctrines that he thinks are true, such as the 
Will to Power and the eternal recurrence. How does Danto and his error theory of truth account 
for these doctrines?  Despite Danto’s conception of truth and his use of ‘metaphysical’ to mean 
illusionary, both appear to be metaphysical, given that he says in his discussion of the Will to 
Power that “there can hardly be anything like evidence for the doctrine in my simple sense of 
evidence” (Danto 204). Note what this translates to in, say, the meaning of the Will to Power: “It 
is a metaphysical, or, better, an ontological concept, for “Will to Power” is Nietzsche’s answer to 
the question “What is there?’” (Danto 215). The Will to Power on Danto’s account is everything 
that is, the underlying fundamental force and substance of the universe. Much as with 
Kaufmann’s interpretation, The Will to Power is the fundamental striving force in the universe 
animating everything living and non-living to further increase its influence and power. This 
interpretation paints Nietzsche as engaging the philosophy of his beloved pre-Socratic 
philosophers. Pre-Socratics had a tendency to try and reduce the world into a single fundamental 
thing: fire, water, or change for example. The Will to Power, on this account, is similar in that it 
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tries to reduce everything to striving force.
Danto holds that the Will to Power is a metaphysical concept corresponding to reality. 
However, Danto’s conception of truth disputes this idea. If the Will to Power corresponds to 
reality, it follows that there is truth in the conventional sense, albeit one that is metaphysical. 
There is also the problem of why this particular metaphysical concept is a truth when all other 
metaphysical concepts are illusions. If Danto holds that this concept is just another falsification, 
then it is easy to be churlish and simply ask why we should take the Will to Power—or anything 
Nietzsche says—seriously. Finally, if the Will to Power is a metaphysical concept, then it is 
difficult to see how its status is consistent with Nietzsche’s opposition to the very idea of 
metaphysics.
Similar problems are encountered in Danto’s discussion of the Eternal Recurrence. As 
with Kaufmann, Danto sees Eternal Recurrence as a scientific truth about the universe. Danto 
tries to offer a scientific justification for the principle, using physics to argue that the universe 
has a large but finite number of combinations, and that given an infinite amount of time, those 
same combinations must inevitably repeat (Danto 205-206). This argument is made despite 
Danto’s criticism of science as never containing any truth. If nothing approaching truth can ever 
be achieved, it is difficult to see how this particular scientific argument is valid. The argument is 
built on premises that also presumably contain truth, such as the universe having a finite number 
of combinations, matter and energy being ultimately neither created nor destroyed, and so on. 
Despite Danto’s denial of truth, he seems comfortable with not only metaphysical truth, but 
scientific truth, as well.  His is a contradictory position. 
Once Danto has made the move of denying all truth and all possibility of ever finding 
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truth, there seems little point in justifying these Nietzschian doctrines. Either they are simply 
further fictions or they are truths of a sort, and therefore a contradiction in Danto's  larger project 
of explaining Nietzsche. For if it is true in any sense that the eternal recurrence is a scientific 
phenomenon, how can all truths be fictions? Danto repeats Kaufmann’s mistake by taking 
Nietzsche to have a single view on truth, though unlike Kaufmann, Danto emphasizes the early 
Nietzsche and the Nachlass. In the end, despite Danto’s taking an approach contrary to 
Kaufmann’s, the problems created are equally insoluble. 
Another radical interpreter who understands Nietzsche’s position on truth in nihilist terms 
is Jacques Derrida. Like Danto, Derrida thinks that the world is an illusion, but one we cannot 
reject. According to Derrida, the structure of language is so laden with metaphysics that nothing 
can be said  outside this construct. Derrida thinks the world is endlessly becoming, and no true 
statement can be made about the world (Clark 14). That is, because language takes a stable being 
as a predicate, language concepts themselves falsify the world. Similar to Nietzsche's early view 
on truth, Derrida thinks the concepts of our minds falsify, and these falsifications cannot be 
rejected. 
On Derrida’s Heideggerian reading, Nietzsche, similarly, could not escape this 
falsification of language, and despite his criticism of truth, he couldn’t help but buy into this 
falsification. This, however, does not stop Nietzsche from thinking deeply about the problems 
that interest Derrida. In a reading that has influenced many radical Nietzschean interpreters, 
Derrida holds that this inconsistency in Nietzsche is actually consistency because it demonstrates 
that language ultimately destroys any attempts to undermine the fictions on which language is 
built. We can consider the strength of this argument by first granting the hypothesis that language 
falsifies and then imagining an argument which logically demonstrates this falsification of 
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language. If we could do this, we would undermine the argument because language is clearly 
being used in a way that overcomes this falsification to convey something true; such a thought 
experiment would also demonstrate that despite the falseness built into these concepts, they can 
be used to convey true things, if one knows enough about language. Instead, on Derrida’s 
account, language, when used to undermine itself, simply breaks down and becomes self- 
contradictory or results in the logical problems found in Danto’s account of truth. 
However, in this failure, deconstructionists like Derrida see hope. For the limits of 
language demonstrate that while the fictions of language can never be replaced with truth, 
fictions can be undermined by precisely the philosophy Nietzsche is articulating with his 
contradictory notions of truth, a philosophy that demonstrates the contradictory nature and 
essential inadequacy of language.
When interpreting Nietzsche’s position, Derrida treats Nietzsche’s writings as equivalent 
in meaning to a note Nietzsche wrote in a margin of the Nachlass: “I’ve forgotten my umbrella.” 
(Clark, 17) With textual truth and indeed, truth itself ultimately undefinable, we are liberated 
from institutional ‘truths’ and conventional interpretations. The ideal that Derrida wants to 
advance with the example of the umbrella as an alternative way of interpreting statements is the 
ideal of ‘playing’ with the text; with the ultimate meaning of the text undefinable, we are free to 
abandon the old baroque, institutional, unchanging style of truth, and instead adopt a new truth, a 
rococo style, a playful, less serious, more personal style toward truth. This new style will have 
the effect of creating a multiplicity of new interpretations for the text. (Though not in the text, 
naturally, since an exclusively textual meaning does not exist.) This in turn creates  more new 
“multiplicity of meanings”, more interpretations, many more than would be possible with the 
old, unchanging predicate style of truth.  Furthermore, this play will enable more interpretations 
xvi
to spring up, a good thing, since one interpretation is, in a sense, as good as another. Thus we can 
have fun debating whether Nietzsche did, in fact, forget his umbrella. Did he leave it on the 
train? Was this umbrella an umbrella of comfortable illusions he had been living under? Was it 
Zarathustra’s umbrella? That no convincing answer develops from this sort of play is 
unimportant because the goal is play and the creation of new meanings, not doing something as 
baroque as trying to find the truth of statements. 
Deconstructionists would argue that this play is, in the Heideggerian tradition, rejecting 
metaphysics; instead of being ‘shepherds of being’, they are fighting against that bad old 
metaphysics by undermining its authority, like a revolutionary running by and cutting off a 
fascist policeman’s tie. However, this argument assumes that deconstructionists have the truth of 
the situation. In Derrida’s case, the ‘play’ involved is engaged in undermining the serious work 
of those old unchanging predicates, a project he sees himself continuing from Nietzsche. Derrida 
also is presumably putting forth this more dynamic interpretive model of truth as somehow better 
if not truer than the old model. As with Danto, this solution suffers from there being no 
consistent way to say, for example, ‘it is true that Derrida’s solution is better than the unchanging 
predicate view of truth.’
As an interpretation of Nietzsche’s theory of truth, this view suffers from major 
difficulties. Nietzsche’s writings are not a set of unconnected fragments;10 they constantly refer to 
each other, both explicitly and implicitly. So, an interpretation (say, ‘morality is bad’) can be 
10 It is, of course, not logically impossible that Nietzsche's writings are a set of unconnected fragments, or are only 
consistent inside the context of a particular book. However this interpretation should be a last resort to understand 
Nietzsche, when all else has failed. This thesis will present a coherent view of Nietzsche, and thus refute the 
fragments theory. 
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checked by looking at what Nietzsche said elsewhere in his published works. One could ask why 
playing with the text is better than the traditional work of finding the truth of a text. Derrida’s 
answer is “because [playing] more closely reflects the truth of the world,” but once again, truth is 
being assumed in the conventional sense in order to justify the interpretation. Playing as 
interpretation doesn’t fit with much of Nietzsche’s philosophy, either. Though Nietzsche is 
famous for occasionally making cryptic statements, he most often makes clear statements even a 
casual reader can understand. Setting aside the problem of truth for a moment, Nietzsche made 
statements, about, for instance, the development of Western Civilization, the decline of 
individuals into herds, and the religiosity at the bottom of atheism, that he clearly wants to 
convey to the reader rather than have the readers ‘play’ for their own amusement. In the end, 
Derrida’s interpretation, like Heidegger's, tells us less about Nietzsche and more about the author 
of the interpretation of Nietzsche.  
Another deconstructionist viewpoint is provided by Paul de Man. de Man’s view, inspired 
by Derrida, holds that Nietzsche’s contradictory view on truth is caused by the inherent 
falsification of language, and that nothing could make true these basic concepts. Unlike Derrida, 
De Man thinks we can demonstrate the inadequacy of language, and by extension, ‘metaphysical’ 
concepts such as truth. We can do so by making contradictory statements and then showing how 
statements which contradict themselves based on rhetoric and metaphor are trying to be ‘true’, 
but always failing. Thus, Nietzsche’s apparently metaphysical or contradictory statements are not 
the product of philosophical confusion, but are, instead, an attempt to undermine statements 
(such as truth claims) by showing how they always end in contradiction.  In his truth theory, de 
Man says that Nietzsche is attempting to show how all statements end in failure; the problems in 
Danto’s account, for example, indicate what, in the end, happens to all statements. The errors and 
contradictions of Nietzsche’s philosophy, far from undermining his philosophy, actually make 
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Nietzsche consistent in his revelations on truth.
While de Man tackles the “contradictory notion of truth,” Sarah Kofman tries to 
incorporate Nietzsche’s doctrines into the deconstructionist viewpoint. Kofman denies the 
metaphysical status to Will to Power that Danto wants to give it, saying instead that it is a rule 
about interpretations and theory in the academic and political sense. Theories, according to 
Kofman, want to overcome other theories, and grow dominant, expanding their power to explain 
(or influence) all aspects of human life. Marxism can be seen in this light. This theory begins as a 
political theory that expands to economics, then to history, and (at least in a communist country) 
comes to influence and control all aspects of human life. Christianity can also be seen through 
this lens of slowly expanding power and influence. Kofman, like other deconstructionists, denies 
truth; the Will to Power is an interpretation of interpretations, but that does not make it truth. But 
if it is only an interpretation, why does Nietzsche, on Kofman’s reading, prefer it to other 
interpretations? Because it is an interpretation that allows for “enrichment and embellishment of 
life” that creates more interpretations for more individual viewpoints (Clarke 15). Like Derrida, 
Kofman assumes that the standard interpretations are either damagingly conformist or filled with 
secret negative values of control from the power center in society. The Will to Power thus is a 
justification of being, not evidence for it. With this theory about theories understood, the Will to 
Power allows a multiplicity of interpretations in life, without insinuating that one way is the one 
true way for everyone. In Kofman’s version, a doctrine like the Will to Power underpins the life 
affirming aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy.  Thus, truth claims are not claims about truth in the 
conventional sense; instead, they are an endorsement of a particular way of living. 
Yet an objection to Kofman’s position arises in that we could ask why, if the multiplicity 
of interpretations makes the Will to Power good, Nietzsche rejects certain manifestations of this 
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interpretation, like morality or religious interpretations as untrue. Kofman could claim that 
Nietzsche rejects such interpretations as life-devaluing, but then it would be true that a moral 
interpretation of life is life- devaluing. To even posit the importance of allowing a multiplicity of 
expressions of life so that the Will to Power can find its fullest expression is to assume that it is 
true that allowing such multiplicity is life- affirming and not life-denying. Like other radical 
Nietzsche interpreters, Kofman needs to have an alternative valuation for accepting one 
interpretation over another, and in so doing, the concept of truth is reintroduced. One must 
always assume it is true that the value one is promoting has property “X”, where X is the value 
one is positing aside from truth. With Danto, the alternative valuation is X works, whereas 
Kofman assumes that X is ‘life-enhancing.’ Kofman’s position suffers from the aforementioned 
problem especially because she wants to put forward her interpretation of Nietzsche as both true 
and life-affirming. Like Danto, her attempt to define values on some other valuation aside from 
truth ends in failure. de Man similarly suffers from this problem because, despite his denial of 
truth, he assumes his interpretation is true of Nietzsche, that is, is a correct interpretation of 
Nietzsche. His assumption cannot be a demonstration of the falsification of language because 
like Danto’s, it must assume either this is another falsification that we try to undermine with 
language or it is a true interpretation. Saying that this contradiction is another demonstration of 
the corruptness of the metaphysics of language will be unhelpful because that interpretation still 
assumes the truth of this theory, despite the contradiction just mentioned. de Man also assumes 
his interpretation teaches us something that is true, that truth being the essential falsity of 
metaphysics and language. Both points assume truth in the conventional sense.   Ultimately, 
Kofman, de Man, and Derrida all assume that their interpretation is true and therefore teaches us 
something about the world.
Both interpretive approaches, radical and conventional, thus fail. What, then, are we to 
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make of Nietzsche’s theory of truth? Is it actually just contradictory? I will argue for the 
remainder of this chapter that Nietzsche’s theory of truth can be made sense of, but only if one 
assumption made by most interpreters is abandoned. We must reject the notion that Nietzsche 
had the same idea of truth throughout his career. If we see Nietzsche’s theory of truth as a 
developing position and not a unitary one, then Nietzsche’s truth theory can be rendered 
coherent. Thus, the problem of Nietzsche’s theory of truth becomes not one of explaining his 
position coherently, but of at least partially telling the story of what Nietzsche thought and why, 
and more particularly why he changed his mind regarding certain issues. 
To understand why Nietzsche’s early view on truth developed as it did, it is necessary to 
understand several interconnected points. First, the reception of Kant’s philosophy was 
significantly different in nineteenth century Germany than it is today. The single biggest 
difference is that Kant was taken to be making an argument for idealism, not an argument against 
idealism (See Norman Kemp Smith, below.) Secondly, this reception colored Nietzsche’s 
thinking on the subject. Most particularly, Nietzsche uncritically accepted several ideas, 
especially the idea of knowledge as correspondence between the phenomenal and the 
metaphysical object, and the validity of the thing in itself. (Clark, 85) Nietzsche, even when 
criticizing other basic concepts, accepted these prevailing ideas uncritically. Finally, even though 
Arthur Schopenhauer was a critical target of Nietzsche in this early period, he accepted an 
important aspect of his philosophy uncritically, namely, Schopenhauer’s theory of perception. 
Schopenhauer believes that what we know is produced “out of the raw materials of a few 
sensations in the organs of sense.” (1813, 75) This theory is an idealist theory, since according to 
Schopenhauer, all we know are sensations, not what those sensations are of. For example: “[it] 
becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that 
sees a sun, a hand that feels the earth...” (1819, 3) Together, these factors led to his early denial 
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of truth. A critical apparatus that places Nietzsche’s claims historically will show that his claims 
depended on a number of views which Nietzsche took from the culture, at least some of which he 
later rejected. 
To put it simply, Kant was generally taken in the nineteenth century by philosophers to be 
making a much different argument than he is taken to have made today. Today, the academic 
consensus on Kant holds that Kant argues for the direct perception of things and defends the 
scientific world view against the skepticism of David Hume. In the nineteenth century Kant was 
thought to be either a metaphysical realist like Descartes, but more complex, or an idealist. This 
nineteenth century view is due partially to what he said in the first edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason and partially because, like Nietzsche, Kant struggled for many years on what he wanted 
to say on the subject of truth. In the first edition of the Critique, according to noted Kant scholar 
Kemp Smith, Kant “refutes the position of Descartes only by virtually accepting the still more 
extreme position of Berkeley” (304). This apparent of Kant's was something his critics (and later, 
his admirers) were quick to pick up on.
Adding to the confusion of eighteenth century philosophers, Kant divided idealism into 
several distinct types, distinguishing between the ‘dogmatic idealism’ of Berkeley, the ‘sceptical 
idealism’ of David Hume and the ‘Transcendental  idealism’ that Kant claimed was his own 
position. That Kant never clarifies what separates these various types of idealism and their very 
different implications understandably created confusion, especially when Kant’s position seems 
close to ‘dogmatic idealism’ in his first edition. Adding still further to the confusion is that, in his 
original refutation of idealism, according to Norman Kemp Smith:  “Kant...wavers between two 
very different definitions of idealism: as being denial of immediate certainty and as a denial of all 
certainty of the existence of material bodies” (Smith, 301). For example, in the first edition, Kant 
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says, “We cannot be sentient of what is outside ourselves, but only of what is in ourselves, and 
the whole of our self consciousness therefore yields nothing save merely our own 
determinations” (Kant, 351). This is a far cry from the refutation of the skepticism and idealism 
that Kant was aiming for, and his critics and readers noticed this disjunction of purpose and 
argument: “Pistorius objected that in making outer appearances relative to inner consciousness 
which in itself appearance, Kant was reducing everything to mere illusion. Hamann came to a 
somewhat similar conclusion, that Kant, notwithstanding his very difficult methods of argument, 
is 'a Prussian Hume', in substantial agreement with his Scotch predecessor” (Smith 305). 
Kant, would-be champion of empirical science, was horrified by this resulting 
interpretation of his views. For this reason, he explicitly refuted this idealism when he published 
his second edition of the Critique. In it, Kant adds a section entitled ‘The Refutation of 
Idealism’, where he demonstrates that we have experience of outer objects and argues that these 
objects must exist outside of us for us to have even perception of inner things, let alone outer 
ones. Smith notes that “Indeed, it [the refutation of idealism] proves the direct opposite of what 
is asserted in the first edition. The earlier Proof sought to show that, as regards immediacy of 
apprehension and subjectivity of existence, outer appearances stand on the same level as do our 
inner experiences. The proof of the second edition, on the other hand, argues that though outer 
appearances are immediately apprehended they must be existences distinct from the subjective 
states through which the mind represents them” (Smith 312). This second argument had the 
effect of emphasizing the phenomenal account of the world that Kant gives rather than the 
noumenal account, as scholars in the twentieth century have noted.11  We can see how different 
11 Noman  Kemp Smith  for  one,  Paul  Di  Giovanni  for  another,  though  Di  Giovanni  takes  the  view that  this 
misinterpretation was also due to the conflict between reason and faith that raged in German circles at the time.
(Giovanni 423.)
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the refutation of idealism is if we follow Smith by comparing two statements from the two 
different editions: “Outer objects (bodies) are mere appearances and are therefore nothing but a 
species of my representations, the objects of which are something only through these 
representations. Apart from them they are nothing’ (Kant, p346 First ed.) ‘Perception of this 
permanent is possible only through a thing outside me, and not through mere representation of a 
thing outside of me’ (Kant, p245, Sec. Ed.)”. This rejection of the first edition's view is an 
important point, and it applies to the reception of the first critique. 
However, either because of the longstanding influence of the first edition of the Critique 
or due to the unclear distinction between idealism (all we perceive are ideas, and to postulate 
anything outside of that is impossible) and metaphysical realism (we perceive the sensations 
caused by exterior objects, but the object behind the sensation, the thing-in-itself, is forever 
unknown to us), Kant was taken by many in the nineteenth century to be an idealist like Berkeley 
or a metaphysical realist who thought that the 'real' was the noumenal. This reception created a 
whole generation of German Idealists who, now that Kant had seemingly disproved the physical 
world, were creating new philosophies to deal with this new world view supposedly discovered 
by Kant.12
It is in this environment that Nietzsche acquired several important ideas on Kant and his 
conception of truth; Nietzsche assumed Kant was making a metaphysical realist argument for the 
perception of reality, not the more phenomenological account that later scholars would 
emphasize. The metaphysical realist argument came with two assumptions about truth—that the 
thing in itself actually exists and that truth is correspondence with the thing in itself. Nietzsche 
12 See, for example, Jakob Froschammer, Immanuel Hermann von Fichte, Hermann Ulrici, and of course, Arthur 
Schopenhauer. (Breazeale 114n.) 
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would later find these ideas wanting. 
Foremost among German Idealists, and influential on Nietzsche was Arthur 
Schopenhauer, who explicitly argued against the Refutation of Idealism: “Schopenhauer, to 
whom this new idea of the critical teaching was altogether anathema, the cloven hoof of the 
Hegelian heresies, denounced it as a temporary and ill-judged distortion of the true critical 
position, maintaining that it is incapable of combination with Kant’s central teaching, and that it 
finds no support, in the tenets, pure and unperverted, of the first edition” (Smith 315-316). 
Schopenhauer explicitly rejected Kant’s clarification and pursued his idealistic philosophy with 
Kant’s early interpretation in mind. This influence did not make Nietzsche into an idealist; as we 
will see, Nietzsche believed in an external world. The main effect of this influence was 
Nietzsche’s adoption of Schopenhauer’s account of perception. 
On Maudemarie Clark's account, Schopenhauer’s conception of truth follows Kant’s first 
edition in that he holds we only have perception of our internal states and never of external 
objects: “At his most extreme, Schopenhauer writes that we do not ‘know a sun or earth, but only 
an eye that sees a sun, and a hand that feels the earth.’ He means that objects we see and feel are 
‘there only as representation, that is, only in reference to another thing, namely, that which 
represents’” (Clark 79). Schopenhauer, like Berkeley, believed that it made no sense to talk of the 
external world given that all we know are our internal perceptions. Also, like Berkeley, 
Schopenhauer thought that it was either nonsensical or a contradiction in terms to talk of objects 
existing independently of consciousness because if objects only exist in our perceptions, they 
cannot have an existence external to us.  Schopenhauer thus sees all sensation as internal nerve 
sensation caused by unknowable outside sources. Though Nietzsche was not an idealist, the 
distinct scientific cast of Schopenhauer’s theory with its talk of nerve sensation is one Nietzsche 
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adopted with his metaphysical realist13 viewpoint.
Nietzsche combines Schopenhauer’s theory of perception (the theory that knowledge is 
only of nerve sensation and our minds) and the ideas of Kant in his early thinking on truth. 
Combined, they had a most surprising result: since the only thing we know is sensation, and truth 
is not agreement with sensation but agreement with the thing in itself, truth is impossible. This is 
the source of Nietzsche’s early skepticism on truth. Though Nietzsche never explicitly articulated 
his argument, Daniel Breazeale attempts to recreate the stages of Nietzsche’s thinking: “1) There 
is no immediate knowing; knowledge always involves a transference between the different 
spheres of subject and object, it is therefore always indirect and mediated. 2) Truth as an ideal 
requires an immediate and direct grasp of the object by subject. 3) Consequently, the truth about 
things cannot be known, for this would require a self-contradictory mediated immediacy. 4) The 
only “truths” available to us are empty tautologies, which are true by definition” (TL Breazeale 
51). Nietzsche’s early skepticism of Truth is based on these four assumptions.
Nietzsche is skeptical about truth throughout his first book, Birth of Tragedy, but this 
skepticism is only made explicit in his unpublished essay “Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral 
Sense” where he denies truth outright and deems statements made about the world as hopeless 
anthropomorphization. Given the preceding discussion, Nietzsche’s talk of truth being a 
“metaphor twice removed” from reality makes sense. First, the metaphor for the sun contained in 
its light, and second, a metaphor for the image conveyed by the light when it is translated again 
to sensation. This idealism is not Nietzsche’s position, however. Nietzsche did evidently believe 
13 Metaphysical Realism is the view that truth as such is correspondence to the thing in itself or the world ‘as it is.’ 
This view relies on an objective view of truth, since there is some final view of the world that is totally correct. This 
view will be examined more closely in the next chapter. 
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in the external world, that is, in objects existing independently of consciousness; however, he 
didn’t believe that we had access to these objects. Thus, saying that sensation and even language 
is a mere metaphor is a metaphor itself, one that contrasts the actual thing in itself with our twice 
removed knowledge of it. As Nietzsche wrote in Truth and Lie: “To begin with, a nerve stimulus 
is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated into a sound: second 
metaphor” (TL 82).
Could language give us truth? Not in the extra-moral sense. Nietzsche writes that ‘true’ 
statements, because they are composed of words, conform to arbitrary social conventions: “The 
liar is a person who uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is 
unreal appear to be real. He says, for example, “I am rich,” when the proper designation for his 
condition would be “poor.” He misuses fixed conventions of even reversals of names” (TL 81) 
Nietzsche then reinforces the point: “What is a word? It is the copy in sound of a nerve 
stimulus”. One can see again the radical skepticism of Schopenhauer at work in the phrase ‘nerve 
stimulus’, despite Nietzsche criticizing Schopenhauer in the same essay (see TL Breazeale 81n). 
With skepticism applied to both sensation and linguistic concepts, it should come as no 
surprise that Nietzsche views a priori truths skeptically as well. In Nietzsche’s view, these truths 
are only true by definition and are, otherwise, ‘empty tautologies’ that teach us nothing about the 
external world. Because they are structures in us, there is no guarantee, indeed, no reason, why 
they should have anything to do with the external world. With this skeptical early view Nietzsche 
despairs of there being a way to reach objective truth since all man’s ‘truths’ have been 
developed and conditioned by the interests of man: “If I make up the definition of a mammal, 
and then, after inspecting a camel, declare 'look, a mammal,' I have indeed brought truth to light 
in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. That is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic 
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truth which contains not a single point which would be 'true in itself' or really and universally 
valid apart from man” (Breazeale 85).   This anthropomorphic aspect of truth seems inescapable 
and suggests that “truths are fictions we have forgotten are fictions.” In other words, a ‘true’ 
statement is not objective because not a correspondence with the thing in itself, and therefore, 
not “true” in the important sense.
Nietzsche's early view does not stand up to critical scrutiny because it encounters the 
same problems encountered by other radical deniers of truth, problems which have already been 
explained in some detail. We shall see in the next chapter that Nietzsche eventually realized this 
position’s vulnerability and moved away from this skeptical position, criticizing the assumptions 
on which his skepticism was based. Even in this very early period, we can see the concern with 
the anthropomorphization of truth  +being only ‘truth in a human perspective’.   Later Nietzsche, 
as we will see in the next chapter, regards this conditioned, perspectival aspect of knowledge as 
true and concludes that trying to escape this conditioning of perspectives is a fundamental 
misunderstanding of truth. This conclusion, along with the abandoning of the idea of the thing in 
itself as incoherent, becomes the cornerstone of Nietzsche’s later epistemology. The dismissal of 
truth as 'anthropomorphic' is valid only if a non-anthropomorphic truth theory is available. As 
Nietzsche begins to doubt the premises of his radical skepticism, he also begins to doubt that 
knowledge can ever take the form of a correspondence to the thing in itself. 
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Chapter 2
Middle Nietzsche on Truth
As I have shown in the first chapter, interpretations of Nietzsche’s theories on truth are 
often contradictory and confused. These difficulties arise because many interpreters have treated 
Nietzsche’s published work, sometimes even the published works and the Nachlass, as a unitary 
whole with one point of view. Interpreters have pursued this thesis either by having Nietzsche 
deny truth altogether or by having Nietzsche give a straightforward interpretation of truth. 
Neither  approach works. The former  leads to contradiction no matter how the arguer defines 
their position, and the latter, unable to deal with Nietzsche’s relativist baggage, inevitably sinks 
the endeavour. 
The unitary position is incorrect because Nietzsche held two different theories of truth at 
different times that are not compatible with one another. The early position, most obvious in The 
Birth of Tragedy and the unpublished essay “Truth and Lie in the Extra Moral Sense,” is that 
truth does not exist for humans, and humans can never escape that all truth is conditioned by 
human interests and perspectives. The early position relied on a set of presuppositions which 
Nietzsche ultimately gave up. The first presupposition held that there is such a thing as a Kantian 
Thing-in-Itself at the root of all perception. The second presupposition is that truth is a relation of 
correspondence to this Thing-in-Itself, and the third, that we can never perceive this Thing-in-
Itself14 because all we know are sense perceptions received from external sources which do not 
14 Nietzsche borrows a page from Schopenhauer with this interpretation. Schopenhauer believed that we never have 
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stand in the truth relation to the thing in itself. The consequence of these early assumptions is 
that truth is an impossibility for human minds. This position is ultimately not coherent, but it is at 
least an understandable one, once we understand Nietzsche’s initial assumptions. The problem, 
of course, is that the assumptions cannot be true together. Nietzsche slowly abandoned both this 
position and the assumptions on which it is based after Truth and Lie. The first break in this 
position comes in Human, All Too Human's re-evaluation of the Thing-in-Itself. 
Nietzsche describes the thesis of thing-in-itself in Human, All Too Human as a 
metaphysical15 thesis, one that could never be proven. While he does not deny the Thing-in-Itself 
could exist, he does deny that such a thing could matter, and we will see that what Nietzsche 
means by mattering will ultimately suggest to him the resources for a non-metaphysical 
conception of truth.  But at this point in the evolution of his thinking, even with the rationale for 
his skepticism  brought into question16, Nietzsche still often maintained a skeptical position 
regarding truth in one form or another,  from Human, All Too Human up to the first section of 
Beyond Good and Evil. Even after he had given up the basis for the Thing-in-Itself, Nietzsche 
continued to hold that concepts still falsify intrinsically, and that we could never know something 
knowledge of objects; we only know nerve impulses that are caused by these objects. (See once again, 1819, 1) 
Since all we know are these nerve impulses, what we know is ‘twice removed’ from truth. 
15 Here, ‘metaphysical’ means ‘not provable’ or having an impact on the real world in any way.
16 The lynch pin of Nietzsche’s skepticism is that because truth is a relation to the thing-in-itself, there is only one 
solution to the problem of an objective form of truth—it is necessarily inaccessible to the human mind. Nietzsche 
never denied that we have sensation, but he held that we can never get beyond that sensation to find out what sort of 
statements about the world are made true by it; in short, sense based claims are not statements of fact but “mere 
anthropomorphizing.” With the Thing-in-Itself downgraded in importance regarding truth, indeed, in HATH 
divorced from it, one can ask (as Nietzsche eventually does) what kind of relation truth is, if not a correspondence to 
the Thing-in-Itself. 
xxx
not conditioned by our interests. These artefacts of Nietzsche’s early skepticism were only 
slowly abandoned between Human, All Too Human and the first section of Beyond Good and 
Evil, as Nietzsche came to the slow realization that without the underpinning of the Thing-in-
Itself, his skepticism regarding truth had no basis.17He would have to come to see that his 
understanding of perception and its falsifying character still depended on theses about the Thing-
in-Itself which he had already given up. 
In the previous chapter, we saw the apex of Nietzsche’s skepticism regarding truth 
expanded in “Truth and Lie in the Extra-moral Sense.” Though still treated by some interpreters 
as an operative form in Nietzsche’s thought, he had quickly abandoned the radically skeptical 
position of “Truth and Lie.”  As we saw in the previous chapter, Nietzsche made several early 
assumptions about the nature of truth. As time went on and as he moved further away from his 
early influences, Wagner and Schopenhauer, he began to question these assumptions.
The most important break that happens with Nietzsche’s early theory is at the start of 
Human, All Too Human, where Nietzsche reverses the radical skepticism he held in Birth and 
Truth and Lie. Here, he drives a wedge between truth in the ordinary sense and metaphysical 
truth, and comes to hold that it is only metaphysical truth that leads to skepticism. Instead of 
thinking that all truth is illusion, he has now come to venerate science as a source of truth. Truth, 
17 To assume a world that is permanently falsified and never unfalsifiable, one must assume an objective world “out 
there” that we can have no possible access to. However, presumably there are arguments to establish the truth of this 
falsification, our inability to know things in themselves being one of them. But once Nietzsche sees that for the 
ordinary empirical sense of truth the existence of a Thing-in-Itself cannot even matter - with the Thing-in-Itself 
divorced even from truth in any sense that can matter - then the argument collapses, since the original argument was 
based on the fundamental connection between truth and the Thing-in-Itself. 
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far from being an indispensable fiction, becomes used in the conventional sense again and is, 
furthermore, highly esteemed: “It is the sign of a higher culture to esteem more highly the little, 
humble truths, those discovered by a strict method, rather than the gladdening and dazzling 
errors that originate in metaphysical and artistic ages and men” (HATH 15). Nietzsche comes to 
see his own philosophy as both true in the conventional sense and as a part of the larger process 
of science’s fight against metaphysical and ‘artistic’ truths (i.e., untruths.) He says,  “The steady 
and arduous progress of science, which will ultimately celebrate its greatest triumph as an 
ontology of thought, will deal decisively with those views”(HATH 24). The distinction between 
humble truths and inaccessible metaphysical truth opens the door to a non-skeptical view of 
truth, though it will still require a revision in his views on the illusory character of sensation. But 
it is a start. With truth possible again, the miasma of skepticism hanging over Nietzsche early 
philosophy has begun to evaporate. 
The important point is that the Thing-in-Itself has been devalued in Nietzsche's thinking 
and has lost its necessary connection to truth; indeed, it is now seen as irrelevant to the larger 
pursuit of truth: “As soon as the origins of religion, art, and morality have been described, so that 
one can explain them fully without resorting to the use of metaphysical intervention at the 
beginning and along the way, then one no longer has as strong an interest in the purely 
theoretical problem of the “Thing-in-Itself” and “appearance” (HATH 18). At this point 
Nietzsche does not deny there could be a metaphysical world; he does deny, however, that such a 
thing could matter to giving a full explanation of the facts:  “It is true, that there might be a 
metaphysical world: one can hardly dispute the absolute possibility of that....For there is nothing 
at all we could state about the metaphysical world except its differentness, a differentness 
inaccessible and incomprehensible to us. It would be a thing with negative qualities....it would be 
the most inconsequential of all knowledge” (HATH 18).  
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From these passages we can see that the Thing-in-Itself has undergone quite a change in 
its truth value from “Truth and Lie”. This devaluation is the result of Nietzsche looking at his 
initial assumptions on truth through the eyes of an inquirer after ordinary knowledge rather than 
through the eyes of a skeptic. The Thing-in-Itself supposedly underlies all objects and is what 
truth ultimately refers to. However, we only know the sensations that emanate from a given 
object (in short, knowledge can only be phenomenal, in Kant’s sense), not the Thing-in-Itself 
underlying it. Since all we know are sensations and knowing the Thing-in-Itself is impossible, 
even in theory, we might then talk of objects in terms of sensations rather than in terms of the 
Thing-in-Itself. Commonsense and scientific knowledge are then possible again, since they 
engage in the realm of the phenomenal, not the realm of the Thing-in-Itself. The Thing-in-Itself, 
in Nietzsche’s thinking, now is orphaned, disconnected from truth and knowledge. 
In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche's argument is that the religious or metaphysical 
values that drive us do not come from the sources they are attributed to, be it heaven or the 
Thing-in-Itself. Rather, they should be understood as caused by hopes and desires we have read 
into the world, an accumulated mass of ‘metaphysical truths’ which are actually false, though 
they will have a causal historical explanation in human thought. However, once we have 
explained metaphysics as another facet of the human, all too human, truth rather than of eternal 
metaphysical truth, these truths lose their glamour because the basis of that glamour was the 
otherworldliness of those values.18 In Human, All too Human, while Nietzsche does not argue 
18 This analysis is an early example of Nietzsche’s genealogical method. Genealogy has the goals showing how our 
ideas developed in a roughly naturalistic way according to our needs and interests rather than as a endless flowering 
of rational expression, and showing that ideas that present themselves as objective have the same human, all too 
human history that all ideas do. By exposing the natural origins of ‘objective and otherworldly’ ideas, one discredits 
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that the Thing-in-Itself could not exist, he thinks that the existence of such a thing would be 
meaningless in the sense of being irrelevant to human knowledge:  “Perhaps we will then 
recognize that the thing-in-itself is worth a Homeric laugh: that it seemed so much, indeed 
everything, and is actually empty, namely, empty of meaning” (HA 16).
Despite the devaluation of the Thing-in-Itself that was once the cornerstone for his radical 
skepticism,  Nietzsche had, at this point, not abandoned his early skepticism entirely. Nietzsche 
retained his criticism of the essential ‘anthropomorphism’ inherent in our basic concepts of truth. 
In HATH, there is a curious tension caused by Nietzsche’s unworked out epistemology. On the 
one hand, he wishes to deny that the metaphysical world has any meaning; on the other, he 
retains his criticism of what he calls ‘anthropomorphic’ ideas, such as his criticism that Kantian 
concepts like space and time are irrefutable errors, since these are things that we read into the 
world and do not exist in the world itself: “Our feelings of Time and space are false, for if they 
are tested rigorously, they lead to logical contradictions” (HATH 19). He similarly notes that 
“when Kant says “Reason does not create its laws of nature, but dictates them to her,” this is 
perfectly true in respect to the concept of nature which we are obligated to apply to her (Nature = 
world as idea, that is, error), but which is the summation of a number of errors of reason” (HATH 
19). Both statements operate under the idea that because our intuitions are judgements we cannot 
help but read into the world, these intuitions are necessary falsifications. 
This skepticism carries over to formal systems of understanding, as well. Logic and 
Mathematics, like the intuitions of space and time, are un-rejectable, but because they are human 
structures, they must be at best an anthropomorphization, at worst a falsification. “Logic, too, 
them, since such ideas  present themselves as objective insofar as they are somehow separate from more 
commonsense knowledge or as their being not of this earth. 
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rests on assumptions that do not correspond to anything in the real world....so (too) it is with 
mathematics” (HATH19). Nietzsche falls back on his earlier position in “Truth and Lie,” 
frequently criticizing truth both as an anthropomorphic extension of ourselves and as not 
anything corresponding to ‘true’: “To a world that is not our idea, the laws of numbers are 
completely inapplicable: they are valid only in the human world” (HATH 27). Without a human 
perspective to read into the world, according to Nietzsche, logic and numbers as we know them 
do not exist, and thus, are errors. But these views are based on the assumption that the Thing-in-
Itself exists and that truth is a relation involving the Thing-In-Itself, despite Nietzsche’s earlier 
claims. The thesis that logic is a falsification, for example, only makes sense if there are objects 
in the world that can be talked about completely divorced from a human perspective.
The Gay Science and Human, All Too Human make for strange reading sometimes, since 
skeptical notions sit alongside affirmations of truth and science19 without any indication 
Nietzsche thinks these are contradictory. But how does science create its little unpretentious 
truths when time and space are merely falsifications? This tension shows us the revising process 
in action. It also shows that while Nietzsche is moving toward his later position, he has not 
completely worked out the implications of that position.
In The Gay Science, we see more evidence of this process of revision. Though 
maintaining his skepticism regarding innate forms of truth, Nietzsche develops an account that 
allows him to deny the Thing-in-Itself.   For example, he says, “What is appearance to me now? 
Certainly not the opposite of some essence: what could I say about any essence except to name 
the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a dead mask that one could place an unknown X or 
remove from it! ” (GS 54) This passage is revealing as evidently X, under examination here, is 
19 See, for example, HATH 15.
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the Thing-in-Itself, and the Thing-in-Itself is made in Kantian terms (that is, as the underlying 
cause of phenomena that we can know nothing about.) The argument, then, is that if we already 
admit that we can know nothing about this metaphysical X, then there is no point in talking about 
it or considering it an object of interest. If the Thing-in-Itself is removed from the perceptual 
equation as superfluous, then the metaphysical scaffolding surrounding objects collapses, leaving 
just the object themselves. Nietzsche has now lost his last reason to be radically sceptical on the 
subject of truth. The championing of science found in Human, All Too Human continues in The 
Gay Science. For example, Nietzsche describes intellectual conscience as “that which separates 
the higher human being from the lower” (GS 2).
Not surprisingly, many comments in both The Gay Science and Human, All Too Human 
will be referred to by interpreters as examples of Nietzsche’s mature view of perspectivism. In 
the preface of Human, All Too Human, he says, “you will learn to grasp the perspective in any 
value judgement” (9). In The Gay Science, Nietzsche discusses the perspectival nature of 
existence: 
“How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether 
existence has any other character than this; whether existence without 
interpretation , without “sense”, does not become “nonsense”; whether, on the 
other hand, all existence is not actively engaged in interpretation — that cannot be 
decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious 
analysis and self examination of the intellect; for in the course of the analysis the 
human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in 
these.” (374)
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Clearly, with the Thing-in-Itself vanishing as a concern, Nietzsche began considering what 
exactly knowing could be if not a correspondence to the Thing-in-Itself.  This new direction in 
thinking about truth would eventually answer Nietzsche's concerns about a priori modes of 
perception, since human perspective being a 'falsification' loses all validity as a criticism once 
perspectivism is adopted. Once it is held that it is impossible to experience the world without a 
perspective or a human interest, “objective” metaphysical truth becomes impossible.20 
That Nietzsche's  perspectivist thesis is still not entirely worked out can also be seen. On 
page 354 of Gay Science, Nietzsche casts perspectivism in the mould of his radical earlier 
skepticism. Here, consciousness is seen as a product of evolution, one that, by definition, must 
falsify given the needs of communication.  Communication, according to Nietzsche, developed 
in lockstep with consciousness, and the purpose of this development was to enable the 
communication of thoughts and sensations between individuals. However, in this translation 
from the unique and idiosyncratic experiences of a given individual to the domain of the 
intelligible, consciousness falsified them. Because communication, for Nietzsche, is about 
conveying generalities rather than aiming for correctness, the unique parts of the experience must 
be removed to make the sensation communicable to others.  Communication, as with anything 
coming into the domain of consciousness, will “always succeed in becoming conscious of what 
is not individual but average” (GS 354). This, then, entails falsification. No communication 
could ever contain truth because, by necessity, it is processed by our falsifying consciousness.  
20 Not surprisingly, The Gay Science also has a formal renunciation of previous influences on Nietzsche. GS 154 
has him renounce Schopenhauer and Wagner, and he does so in the spirit of Brutus and Caesar; that is, betraying a 
friend in order to stay true to oneself.
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Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we become 
conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world that is made common and 
meaner; whatever becomes conscious becomes by that same token shallow, thin, 
relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a 
great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and 
generalization. (GS 354) 
Another example of Nietszche’s radical skepticism is clearly shown both in his aphorism, “What 
are man’s truths ultimately? Merely his irrefutable errors” (GS 265) and in his claim that “life is 
no argument. The conditions of life might include error” (GS 121). Gay Science contains several 
statements of scepticism, for example, his observation that “if we had not welcomed the arts and 
invented this kind of cult of the untrue, then the realization of general untruth and 
mendaciousness that now comes to us through science — the realization that delusion and 
error are conditions of human knowledge and sensation — would be utterly unbearable” 
(107). Nietzsche’s skepticism on truth comes from his seeing truth as an anthropomorphic 
principle: “We operate only with things that do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible 
time spans, divisible spaces. How should explanation be at all possible when we first turn 
everything into an image, our image!” (GS 112)
This skepticism persists in Nietzsche until he successfully makes the final break with his 
initial assumptions about truth. This break comes early in Beyond Good and Evil, where 
Nietzsche explicitly rejects the Schopenhauerian perception argument. Here, he says that “one 
must insist that sense organs are not phenomena in idealistic philosophy; as such they could not 
be causes!” (BGE 15) Nietzsche gives a simple argument for this: “What? And others even say 
that the external world is the work of our organs? But then the body, as a part of this external 
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world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be--the work of 
our organs!” (BGE 15) This reductio ad absurdum allows Nietzsche to finally reject both 
Schopenhauer and his lingering skepticism about the phenomenal world bequeathed by Kant. 
Clearly, if Nietzsche wants to discuss an empirical account of human knowledge, he cannot 
assume that all sense data is generated by the organs. To pursue his larger thesis, the external 
world is necessary. 
To cement this new epistemic direction, Nietzsche denies even the possibility of the 
Thing-in-Itself, calling it a contradiction in terms: “as though knowledge here gets a hold of its 
object purely and nakedly as “the Thing-in-Itself” without any falsification on the part of either 
the subject or the object. But the “immediate certainty,” as well as the “absolute knowledge” and 
the “Thing-in-Itself,”involves a contradictio in adjecto I shall repeat a hundred times; we really 
ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!” (BGE 16) Through this objection to the 
Thing-in-Itself, Nietzsche  flatly denies that the Thing-in-Itself could exist. 
The essential problem with Nietzsche’s position from HATH through GS to the first 
section of BGE is that, throughout this period, Nietzsche never abandons the form of 
representationalism that he picked up from Schopenhauer. This representationalism is kept by 
Nietzsche partially because the idea that nerve impulses are the final domain of knowledge 
strikes him as scientific, but mostly because he never examines how his initial assumptions are 
interrelated. Without a metaphysically objective world or a Thing-in-Itself, Nietzsche has no 
argument for calling formal systems un-rejectable falsifications or for supporting 
Schopenhauer’s idealism in sense perception. As Clark puts it, 
It [Schopenhauer’s representationalism] is responsible for his continued denial of 
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truth in GS and BGE and his failure to recognize that this denial required the 
positing of a “true” world. As I have argued, representationalism made idealism 
necessary once Nietzsche rejected the Thing-in-Itself, and that, in conjunction 
with his naturalized Kantian theory of knowledge, made the equation of reality 
with chaos of sensation seem reasonable. This, in turn seemed to provide a basis 
for considering illusionary the non-chaotic world of which we have knowledge 
without committing him to a belief in a “true” world. But this position is 
vulnerable to the reductio Nietzsche himself explained in BGE 15. (Clark 124)
But what is truth without a Thing-in-Itself? Nietzsche’s later answer to this question is 
here referred to as perspectivism, and is a close relative to the classical form of American 
pragmatism which was developing independently at about the same time.21 Perspectivism can be 
summarized as the view that truth is an epistemic notion, a measure of success of a form of 
conduct or coping that always happens in a perspective (that is, belongs to a perceiver) and 
thereby reflects a set of interests (broadly, what kind of answers are being looked for and what 
constitutes an answer in a given perspective.)  Explicitly anti-foundationalist, perspectivism is 
the result of Nietzsche seeing the collapse of the Thing-in-Itself into a metaphysical contradiction 
and then presenting a non-metaphysical account of knowledge as success in conduct governed by 
interests.  Perspectivism allowed Nietzsche to offer an account of truth in the normal sense 
(common sense, scientific, and the other practical truths) while at the same time offering a 
criticism of  truth understood as an objective metaphysical relation. This criticism rules out, for 
21 Pragmatism rejects truth as a metaphysical correspondence and makes many assumptions that Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism also makes. For example, pragmatism holds both that the Thing-in-Itself is unimportant in truth and 
that knowledge is a natural phenomena with no foundationalist basis. These arguments are made explicit later in the 
chapter. 
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Nietzsche, a number of philosophical shibboleths—the concept of the Thing-in-Itself, the 
unconditioned object, the unconditioned or God’s eye view point, and foundationalist accounts of 
knowledge (or any system that seeks to establish the final principles of truth)—that could 
establish the final principles of all truth. Nietzsche’s Perspectivism can be classified as a kind of 
pragmatism because, like classical pragmatists, Nietzsche has come to see inquiry as grounded in 
a kind of psychobiological model22 of the human organism according to which inquiry consists in 
struggle to meet needs which are largely biologically determined and in which truth is successful. 
This section of the chapter will concern itself with an overview of Nietzsche’s perspectivism and 
some of its consequences.
No Thing-in-Itself:  Nietzsche, after struggling with the implications of Kant’s 
phenomenal account of knowledge on one hand and the idealism of German philosophers on the 
other, initially eliminated the Thing-in-Itself as a meaningful pursuit of knowledge and later 
denied the existence of such a thing altogether. With the Thing-in-Itself eliminated from the 
equation, what, then, is the remainder? What are objects on Nietzsche’s account? An object, to 
borrow a phrase from Alexander Nehamas, is a sum of its effects. An object, without a Thing-in-
Itself, becomes the sum of whatever we can sense from it and its associated meanings, and 
nothing else. Working from Kant’s phenomenal account, Nietzsche thought we perceive things, 
but underneath these things there is no real object in the form of a Thing-in-Itself. Like the 
concept in physics of an ether, a universal substance that suffuses everything but affects nothing, 
the Thing-in-Itself has been eliminated as superfluous. Formerly, objects were seen as having 
perspectival values, such as weight, that attached to the metaphysical objectiveness of the object. 
22 See, for example, Robert Brandon, “The Pragmatist Enlightenment”, European Journal of Philosophy 12:1: 
1-16, or Murray Murphy, “Kant's Children – The Cambridge Pragmatists,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Socitey Winter 1968, Vol. 4 Issue 1: 3-31. 
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With the Thing-in-Itself removed, an object becomes everything that is knowable about it, and 
nothing else.
No God’s eye view: The God's eye view is a metaphor. This metaphor suggests that there 
is a point of view, God’s, from which everything seen is unconditioned by the features which 
make up a point of view.  But this notion of an impartial, unlimited point of view is incoherent. 
In the literal sense of the term, a point of view is a physical location which affords the eye a view 
upon a landscape. Not everything can be seen from a point of view because some things block 
the view of other things, some things are not located in the direction the eye looks, and so on. 
This literal notion is metaphorically expanded to include other cognitive ‘locations’ that are also 
limited in a way, and these limits allow the metaphor to have traction so that a metaphorical point 
of view is bound by what the mind’s eye can ‘see’. A fox and a rabbit will not see the same 
things even when their eyes aim at the same terrain because they are conditioned by their 
interests and needs to find some features salient and others not. Extending the metaphor to God 
expands this notion beyond any location and any limitation, and because these limitations are 
what gives the metaphor its cognitive content, beyond any coherent application. The suggestion 
following from a God’s eye view is that there is a way things are which is relevant to human 
purposes—and so can ground knowledge or value claims—yet utterly transcends the limitedness 
of the human.   By rejecting the Kantian thing-in-itself (itself a retreat from a God’s eye view) 
and offering a perspectival account of what makes cognitive claims true, Nietzsche utterly shuts 
the door on such a notion.  
‘God's Eye’ truth is impossible under perspectivism. Perspectivism requires that all views 
are conditioned by a perspective, a viewer. Thus, no view could ever escape this limitation and 
become metaphysically objective (I’ll call this Objectivism) in the sense philosophers have 
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looked for. The search for the God’s eye view demonstrates a lack of understanding of what it is 
to have a perspective in the first place. No human view could ever fully encompass everything 
on a given issue, since to look at something is to see things and not see certain others. No 
perspective can take everything into account because a perspective and an interest necessarily 
involve selecting and omitting depending on position and interest. For example, a landscape can 
be seen from a hill or from a topographical map, but there is no final or complete view of that 
landscape. Indeed, the very definition of ‘landscape’ is perspectival; it is how the land looks from 
a perspective.  God’s eye view, the view from nowhere, is literally unintelligible because, much 
like Kant’s categories, perspective must be assumed if the barest sense of the real world is to be 
made. One might as well say ‘without thinking’ or ‘seeing without awareness’ as to look for the 
God's eye point of view. 
The two senses of “seeing” used to unpack this metaphor are perspective as literal seeing, 
and perspective as cognitive interest. Perspective as literal seeing is a consequence of the 
embodiment of the knower; that is, the knower must occupy one particular place in space and 
time, and will see different things depending on where she is and in what direction she looks. 
Consider a house. Someone can describe the house from the front by noting a front door, some 
flowers alongside the walk, a garage facing the road. Those on a different side of the house may 
see only the garage, and say they see only a large wall with a single door on the side. Both views 
are correct in the perspective we might call ‘describe what is seen’. Certainly, no one would say 
that because there is no ‘one’ view of the house, the house must not exist, and actually, both 
views are objective in any ordinary sense of the word. Yet this is the view assumed by 
metaphysical realism as Nietzsche understands it. According to his understanding of 
metaphysical realism, there is one final view of the house that will satisfy all viewers of the 
house for the rest of time. 
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The second sense of perspective is that of cognitive interest. A unicorn and a sabre 
toothed tiger see each other in the woods. In the cognitive perspective of the unicorn, it sees 
something that it must run away from; the tiger sees dinner. Assuming unicorns are herd animals, 
if a unicorn were to see another unicorn, it would see an ally; if a sabre-toothed tiger saw another 
tiger, it would see a rival to drive out of its hunting territory. None of these judgements are 
incorrect, yet the advice they offer for successful action are relative to the cognitive interests they 
inform; so, too, with objects in the real world. A ball-peen hammer is a tool, a useful 
bludgeoning device, and Exhibit B for the prosecution, depending on whose perspective we 
assume. The relevant point to notice here is that the relativity of these perspectival judgements is 
completely benign and consistent with objectivity in the ordinary sense. There is no place for 
either skepticism or metaphysical realism to gain a vantage point for criticism.  Nonhuman 
animals can only perceive those aspects of the world they need to represent in order to guide 
their behaviour.  Their worlds are small and restricted because they can only attend to what is 
given them by their needs.  Surely humans have similar limitations and can only represent what 
is available from within the ‘human perspective’. This thought can lead to the worry that because 
our world is given to us by our interests, we cannot represent the objective world. But this 
doesn’t follow. First, nonhuman perspectives cannot be so limited. There is no reason to think 
that when the fox perceives the rabbit in terms of its own interests or needs as food, it is getting 
something wrong, or that  when it pounces on the rabbit, its perception of space is merely 
subjective. The opposite is true; if the fox couldn’t get the location of the rabbit right, relative to 
its powers of movement, it couldn’t catch the rabbit.  Secondly, that a creature represents only 
certain things in its world does not mean it represents the world as containing only those things: 
“The limits of one's representation of the world is not a representation of the limits of one's 
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world.”23 
This raises the question of why perspectivism implies falsification for most people. This 
implication comes from the attractiveness of the metaphysical correspondence theory. 
Nietzsche's point regarding truth is very simple. He notes that even though we have always been 
comfortable with the two types of perspective outlined above, we have always had a tendency to 
assume that truth in a philosophical or scientific sense is somehow very different than this. But 
this assumption calls for an argument. One of the essential points of perspectivism is that all 
truth, even scientific truth, works in this everyday manner. Nietzsche argues that the roots of the 
opposite idea lie in Greek philosophy, where the eternal, unchanging forms were the ‘real truth’ 
whereas the world of everyday appearance was mere appearance. The Greeks’ overwhelming 
desire to find stable, unchanging values to base things like the concept of justice on caused them 
to invent another metaphysical world to give the world the meaning and value desired by 
philosophers.  
The idea that enquiry is forever constrained by perspective and so cannot be true unless 
underwritten by Objective truth or a God's eye view is, quite simply, false. If it were true, 
knowledge would be impossible. But it is more than false; it is simply a non sequitur. Nietzsche 
was briefly attracted to the skeptical view because, as argued earlier, he took it to be a 
consequence of the unknowability of the Thing-in-Itself. But as he later came to see, epistemic 
truth functions as it always has, and it is unproblematic to make statements about objects and 
make theories about them in the actual world. The world of stuff and things remains unaffected 
23 Ruth Millikan, "Useless Content." In G. Macdonald and D. Papineau eds. Teleosemantics . Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,  2006.
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by this change.24
Another argument against the idea of the “one true theory,” as Hillary Putnam in Reason,  
Truth and History points out, is that there is not only no one true way to describe something, but 
often a polyphony of true ways to describe something (73). Putnam gives an example involving 
Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetic fields and the retarded potential theory of magnetic fields 
which acts at the speed of light, in contrast to Maxwell's theory, who has the forces  acting 
instantaneously:
The Maxwell Field theory and the retarded potential theory are incompatible from 
a metaphysical point of view, since either there are or there aren't causal agencies 
(the ‘fields’) which mediate the action of separated particles on each other (a 
realist would say.) But the two theories are mathematically inter-translatable. So if 
there is a ‘correspondence’ to the noumenal things which makes one of them true, 
then one can define another correspondence which makes the other theory true. If 
all it takes to make a theory true is abstract correspondence (never mind which), 
then incompatible theories can be true. (Putnam 73)
If we really can have true statements about the world that are at the same time metaphysically 
incompatible, even inconsistent with each other, then it becomes impossible to see how any sort 
of ‘God’s eye’  truth could make sense. Aliens might describe the phenomena we describe as 
Einstein's Relativity, but there is no guarantee, indeed, little reason to think that these Aliens 
24 It is not generally realized that this also functions as an attack against absolutist theories of morality. Nietzsche’s 
later philosophy has an epistemic argument against such accounts of morality, in addition to his more explicit 
arguments.
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would end up with an equation like E = mc2.
No foundational knowledge. The foundationalist view of knowledge, such as was 
assumed by Descartes, takes truth to be founded on basic beliefs which are self evident or 
certain. These self evident truths can justify other beliefs and even provide an interest neutral 
perspective from which to consider questions about what is true. Unsurprisingly, Nietzsche 
thought foundational knowledge  impossible. The first objection is perspectival. The possibility 
of Foundational knowledge presupposes that real knowledge must take the form of some truth 
that no rational creature could object to and still be rationally justified. This presupposition is 
objectionable for reasons already stated. Nietzsche found this objectionable for a second reason, 
as well. The idea of a ‘neutral corner’ in foundational knowledge is exactly the sort of view 
without interest that perspectivism forbids. On perspectivism, truth is contextually useful in some 
situations but not in others. The ship of knowledge can never be beached and rebuilt from the 
ground up, for there is no objective land on which to beach her. 
On Nietzsche's mature perspectivist account, knowledge is developed as a process. Truth 
and knowledge are forever conditioned by perspective, and only the perspective can decide what 
answers are good enough to satisfy it. Truth and knowledge are organic processes that 
accumulate through our interests and investigations. The tools that come out of this process can 
be applied to further investigations. Here, we might consider Nietzsche’s theory that the 
Renaissance was caused by the strict discipline and intellectual tools developed in the Middle 
Ages. Throughout history, earlier discoveries and advances were either used as a basis for, or 
revealed to be inadequate for, humanity's purposes. Ptolemaic astronomy is useful for navigation 
if one is in the Mediterranean, but of only limited use if one is navigating the ocean. Aristotle’s 
theory of earth, air, fire, and water was adequate physics until human beings encountered 
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problems with it in the context of the larger world. Classical mechanics was, for a time, so 
successful that Lord Kelvin described  in 1900 the strange behaviour of light that classical 
mechanics did not account for as “one of the few 'minor clouds' in the otherwise brilliant sky of 
modern science.” (Dewitt, 192) The attempts to solve this problem led to Einstein's theory of 
relativity and quantum mechanics. In this process, the interests of humanity lead to further 
questions after the original question is answered, for the inadequacies of the previous theory to 
solve specific problems drive people to find the next one. When a theory works well enough, 
although enquiry in general may never come to an end, human beings are satisfied with the 
answers the theory offers. Classical Mechanics are still the bread and butter of engineering 
simply because Newtonian physics can give the accurate answers needed to build normal sized 
objects. 
The development of truth and science on Nietzsche's conception is a drive to satisfy 
cognitive needs, where cognitive needs are understood as a desire to know the truth of a given 
situation. An example of this cognitive need in practice is the canary in the coal mine. Early coal 
miners faced a vexing problem in the form of odourless carbon monoxide gas. This gas would 
cause miners to pass out and eventually asphyxiate. Because the build-up of gas was often 
gradual, miners often did not notice the gas build-up until the danger of unconsciousness and 
death was very near. The solution was to bring a canary into the mine. Canaries, like humans, 
would pass out when odourless carbon monoxide built up, but because of the bird’s higher 
metabolism, it would pass out before the miners were affected, thus allowing them to escape 
before the gas affected them. Thus, the need to know when carbon monoxide was in the air was 
satisfied. When the method was instituted, the miners only knew that an odourless gas was 
occasionally released when mining coal; the details of why this happened were beyond them. 
This method for gas detection was so successful that the canary remained in place even after the 
invention of more modern detectors, since the detectors gave no obvious sign when broken, 
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unlike the canaries. A thesis of perspectivism is revealed in this example in that the adequacy of 
any answer will depend on the questioner’s needs and reasons. 
Perspectivism holds that some perspectives on a problem are superior to others because 
they give us more of what we want in an answer. The practice of using canaries in coal mines 
remained such an effective solution to the problem of gas leaks that the canaries remained in use 
long after other feasible solutions were available.   Also, Perspectivism does not rule out  the 
possibility of a perspective that permanently satisfies someone’s interests. Consider that while 
technically Einstein’s physics are more accurate than Newtonian physics, Einsteinian physics are 
much more complicated than Newton’s and only deviate meaningfully from Newton’s on the 
subatomic and cosmic scales. For the practical problems many engineers face, Newton's physics 
gives the needed accuracy. This example shows us that ‘coming to a satisfactory conclusion’ is 
frequently confused with ‘coming to the end of inquiry,’ the idealized reference pragmatists offer 
in their account of the stability of truth. Here, perspectivism is again at work; when an agent's 
cognitive interests are satisfied (as when finding a satisfactory truth to the matter),  then the 
agent's inquiry comes to an end because the questions asked aim at specific answers. If the 
answers found accomplish all that the questioner desires, then clearly there will be no further 
searching for an answer. What the idealized conception and the practical one have in common is 
that the answer found is stable and does not undergo further change.   
Nietzsche's perspectivism, with its vision of building the ship of knowledge as it sails, 
appears to leave us with a problem. We must consider whether his mature view implies truth is 
merely a social convention, as Nietzsche seemed to believe in his early works, or whether truth is 
merely what is rationally justifiable. Over the remainder of this chapter we will examine several 
possible versions of this worry, and I will argue that each is an over-reaction to oversimplified 
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worries. So the short answer is “No, Nietzsche was not a relativist.” The aim of truth is to 
describe, within a context, the world in an epistemically right way, and so for any context there 
will be true and false, good and bad answers. 
Let us begin with the statement ‘the earth is flat.’ We could ask if this statement was true 
when man believed it to be true. As Putnam remarks,  
The statement ‘The Earth is flat’ was, very likely, rationally acceptable 3,000 years 
ago; but it is not rationally acceptable today. Yet it would be wrong to say that ‘the 
earth is flat’ is true 3000 years ago; for it would mean that the earth had changed 
its shape. (Putnam  55)
In a social perspective, the statement is true, for people did believe this and acted on this belief; 
however, in the epistemic perspective, it fails. The earth is round, and always has been. 25 This 
25 You can see perspective at work even in this statement. In this statement, the word ‘always’ is not technically 
true; once, the earth was a series of swirling, slowly coagulating lumps of rock, with slowly increasing forces of 
gravity making a single structure, collecting gas and other lighter elements as it went. This statement is also true but 
irrelevant in this context.
l
particular epistemic context (making statements about how the earth has always been round) has 
good reason for rejecting the earlier interpretation. Epistemic truth aims to describe the world as 
it is, and as such, there are true and false statements in that context. In the same way, there are 
good and bad answers for how an individual should live, and this context forms the basis for 
much of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
At this point the reader may wonder whether Nietzsche's perspectivism is not, in the end, 
narrowly and circularly self-refuting, in much the same way radical scepticism was earlier seen 
to be self-refuting. That is, if everything is perspectival, then perhaps even perspectivism is 
perspectival. If perspectivism is merely perspectivally true, then it is also perspectively false 
from another perspective. This thought could imply that there are non-perspectival truths, that 
there is a foundational aspect that perspectivism tries to conceal. 
There are two ways to consider these worries. Firstly, as we have seen, foundationalism is 
not so much a method for searching for epistemic truth as it is a set of metaphysical assumptions 
about what truth should look like and how it should function.  Perspectivism is different because 
it doesn't seek to create a theory about what could be true a priori; rather, it seeks to delineate 
what could not possibly be true a priori. We can understand the world through perspectivism, but 
perspectivism is not a metaphysical platform dictating what knowledge must be about. 
Secondly, we can consider the purported self refutation of perspectivism. Given the self- 
refutation of postmodern theories of truth seen in the previous chapter, a canny skeptic could ask 
if perspectivism itself is self-refuting. The claim that everything is perspectival suggests there is 
one thing not perspectival, that is, perspectivism. The claim is, in short, that if perspectivism is 
true, then there is at least the one non-perspectival truth that ‘perspectivism is true’; but if there is 
li
a non-perspectival truth, then perspectivism, which says that truth is perspectival, is false. This 
would be an effective argument were it not for its formulation. For perspectivism does not state 
that everything is perspectival. Instead, it states that all judgements happen, or are made from 
within a perspective. The latter statement is a truth about truth formation; the former is an 
attempt to make a metaphysical claim based on perspectivism. Perspectivism, as was said earlier, 
is a doctrine about the limitations of one's representation of the world; it is not a doctrine about 
one's representation of the limits of one's world. Perspectivism merely says that for any view one 
has, there may be another view for truth, not that there must be another view for truth. As an 
account of the nature of theories, perspectivism holds that every theory must always be open to 
the possibility of revision. But the claim that there is a possibility of an alternative view is not the 
same as the claim that there actually is an alternate view,  and this second claim is needed to 
generate a destructive regress which one can only escape by moving, in the end, to a non-
perspectival view. Consequently, the openness to alternatives required by perspectivism does not 
mean that the theses of perspectivism inevitably lead to a non perspectival view26   
We can gain a better understanding of Nietzsche's mature perspectivism by examining 
alternate views of his perspectivism. Two important Nietzsche scholars, Richard Schacht and 
Alexander Nehamas, have identified Perspectivism as a vital step in understanding Nietzsche. 
They have distinctly different views of Nietzsche’s thought, but both agree that Nietzsche was an 
empiricist in his approach to truth. Somewhat oddly, however, despite this claim of empiricism, 
and despite the marked change in Nietzsche's views on truth which I have documented in this 
thesis, these philosophers also say that Perspectivism falsifies, and thus, truth for Nietzsche is not 
ordinary, non-metaphysical truth as it has been conventionally understood. I shall argue that the 
views of both philosophers ultimately fail, though understanding why they fail can further our 
26 In other words, it does not mean there is always 'another way' to view things, i.e., a way other than perspectivism. 
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understanding of the view of perspectivism Nietzsche actually holds. 
Richard Schacht sees perspectivism as entailing falsification, and he attempts to avoid the 
problems in this view that were covered in my first chapter by limiting the falsification to the 
perspectives of common sense and science. The truths of common sense and science, according 
to Schacht, are products of our drives and interests, and thus a distortion of what is in the world. 
In addition, Schacht argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism escapes this distortion. Richard 
Schacht is a Nietzsche scholar who believes Nietzsche’s thought is unitary, and this belief allows 
him to incorporate the earlier, radically sceptical Nietzsche with the later Nietzsche of 'science is 
a noble thing'. He therefore fails to make the inference that though we can never escape the 
conditioning of perspectivism, we can take steps to ameliorate the impact it has on our search for 
truth.  
At this point the shrewd reader might counter by arguing that Schacht is making a 
distinction between appearances and the Things-in-Themselves or some other ground of 
nonperspectival  knowledge, despite Nietzsche’s having denied both. Schacht, aware of this 
possible objection, qualifies his argument in two ways. First, as a counterargument to the view 
that one perspective is as good as another (a definite problem if all perspectives falsify), Schacht 
writes that Nietzsche would not say these perspectives are inadequate unless he had achieved a 
perspective that established this through a better perspective. Clearly, Nietzsche did think there 
were both truths of a sort and better perspectives; otherwise, much of his philosophical project 
would have never left the ground. Second, Schacht uses the definition of objectivity Nietzsche 
gave in Genealogy of Morals by defining objectivity as “a variety” of perspectives in the service 
of knowledge (Nietzsche GM III). By defining objectivity in this way, claims Schacht, Nietzsche 
makes a distinction between knowledge and perspectives as such. Nietzsche’s philosophy is then 
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not a falsification because it employs many perspectives at once, a kind of meta perspectivism 
that  refuses to get locked into any one perspective. Thus, common sense and science falsify 
because they are locked into a unitary (or single) view, while Nietzsche (and presumably, 
anybody using the same meta-perspectival view) will avoid falsification. By using many 
perspectives, that is, by adopting a meta-perspective, we can overcome the regress of self-
falsification of perspectivism. 
In spite of its initial attractiveness, there are a number of difficulties with this view. If 
perspectives falsify as such, then there must be a truth beyond our perspective that our senses 
distort, but that nonetheless serves as the condition on which what is viewed is falsified. But the 
basis of Schacht’s assertion is obscure. In later texts Nietzsche is quite explicit about rejecting 
such a view. Just as problematically, by adopting multiple perspectives, as Schacht advocates, we 
are, at the end of the day, merely adopting another perspective. A perspective, even a meta-
perspective with many different views, is still a perspective, and if perspectives are falsifying as 
such, it is still presumably falsifying.  On the other hand, if we resist the suggestion that a meta-
perspective is another perspective, then, perhaps Schacht thinks it would be like having a set of 
choices from which people can choose one perspective, from a set of mutually exclusive 
perspectives to apply in a given situation. Yet any such choice would enter into falsification 
again.  Choosing one of a number of falsifying views that can be adopted is hardly a way to 
avoid falsification.
Furthermore, Schacht has not evaded the charge of presupposing the Thing-in-Itself. At 
one point Schacht writes of things being “Elevated from their place within some domain of 
discourse and human experience and elevated for inclusion in an account of the way the world 
is” (Schacht 112). He is not far from the thing-in-itself when he speaks of “the issue of our long 
liv
term collective interaction with an underlying reality, with which they are far from agreeing” 
(Schacht 112). Clark writes, “I believe this answer presupposes the very model of knowledge 
Nietzsche uses perspectivism to combat” (Clark 154). Because Schacht is not a relativist yet 
cannot base the value of truth in the normal everyday sense, his view defaults to metaphysical 
realism when discussing truth. 
Alexander Nehamas's account of Nietzsche's perspectivism is more complex. 
Nehamas has several different formulations of how 'perspectivism falsifies' which he treats as 
equivalent, but these various formulations have different implications. Nehamas's view is also 
interestingly different from Schacht's view; indeed, he explictly denies Schacht’s premise that 
common sense and science falsify. But Nehamas still tries to defend the falsification thesis as an 
implication of perspectivism. In his book Nietzsche Life as Literature, Nehamas  argues in the 
chapter called “Untruth as a Condition of Life” that while perspectivism does not deny scientific 
facts or truths, it falsifies such truths due to the very conditions of perspectivism, thus making 
untruth a condition of life (42). The reason that Nehamas gives for this is that a perspective 
always falsifies, but the implication of this statement changes depending on how 'falsifies' cashes 
out.  Nehamas has three different formulations, and he evidently sees all these formulations as 
interchangeable.
Nehamas uses the first sense of ‘falsifies’ when he notes that we act only on part of 
relevant data, never on “all the information” or a complete set of data (Nehamas, 49).27 This is 
27 For example, I have only met so many people, yet I make judgements about all of them on the basis of this 
experience. Thus my ideas must be open to revision, or even falsification based on future experiences, but as noted 
above, that does not make my initial beliefs false, just revisable.  
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true but does not necessarily entail falsification. For me to write on Alexander Nehamas’s theory 
of perspectivism, it is by no means necessary to read everything he has ever written. Indeed, a 
thesis is based on the idea of selecting what is relevant and leaving the rest behind; taking into 
account all Nietzsche scholarship would be impossible. I can write a thesis on Nietzsche’s theory 
of truth that is nonetheless correct; however, the facts in this context dictate that certain things be 
studied and certain things ignored. A decision or statement in the context of perspectivism would 
only be false if it ignored something relevant to the question at hand; if it gets all details in its 
interest correct, then it is true. 
Nehamas  uses the second type of falsification when he argues that there can be no final 
theory of anything possible, because a different perspective could propose another theory 
(Nehamas 51). This objection does not entail falsification either, unless the metaphysical realist 
view is taken,28and we have just seen that the openness to indefinite change does not entail a 
regress forcing one into realism. Given  that perspectivism is explicitly anti-foundational, this 
seems to be an implication of perspectivism, but a non-objectionable one from a epistemic 
perspective. As we saw earlier in this chapter, Hillary Putnam gave an illustration of mutually 
exclusive physical theories that are nonetheless mathematically relatable as a demonstration that 
it does not follow from there being many ways to describe something that those descriptions are 
false. And once again, it is worth repeating that a theory might remain in service for a long time, 
even indefinitely, if it satisfied the interests of those involved. 
Both types of simplification are variations on the claim that ‘another view could 
be true’. But, of course, though this is true, it does not imply that everything we know is 
28 The Metaphysical realist view would insist that there is one final view to truth, and thus final theories are 
possible, even expected if one is on the path to truth. 
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falsified.  However, Nehamas gives a third version of perspectivism which he evidently conflates 
with the first two views:  that there are not only alternative theories (to the beliefs we have) that 
could be true; the opposite of  what we believe not only could be true, but is true. Nehamas gives 
a quotation from Nietzsche to support this: “the world is only thought, or will, or war, or love, or 
hate...separately, all this is false: added up it is true” (Nehamas 50). This version is different from 
the previous statements and does imply falsification. It is one thing and quite unproblematic to 
assume another view aside from yours exists or that a view of yours could be falsified in the 
future. It is an entirely different thing, and obviously false, to say that X is concurrently true and 
false.  Assuming a truth theory that allows such a contradiction eliminates all possibility of 
making intelligible statements about X. It is this view that Nehamas thinks proves untruth as a 
condition of life.29   
This view seems to be what Nehamas means when he speaks of untruth as a condition of 
life, but this view goes much further than defending the world of conventional truth; it  leads 
Nehamas (and his theory about Nietzsche) into radical skepticism. If it is both true and false that 
Nietzsche has a coherent theory of truth, then there is by definition no truth about Nietzsche’s 
truth theory. The difference between this and the earlier statements is the difference between 
saying ‘there may be’ and ‘there is’. These two statements have very different implications in 
truth, since one is entirely compatible with the non-skeptical perspectivism of the later 
Nietzsche, whereas the other entails radical skepticism. With this version of falsification in 
operation, Nehamas cannot have common sense, scientific truth, or even truth about Nietzsche’s 
philosophy outside of a relativist context. Thus, while Nehamas can make many useful 
29 Nehamas thinks that this view underlies Nietzsche's doctrine of “what is good for one is bad and dangerous for 
another.” Instead of people having different powers, limits and capacities, Nehamas believes that one view is true in 
one perspective and false in another. These issues are dealt with in more depth in chapter 3.
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observations about perspectivism, his third thesis of falsification does not stand up.
Neither attempt at understanding Nietzsche works because, in both cases, the philosopher 
in question thinks that the falsification thesis is somehow compatible with truth and science as 
we know it. As we have seen in this chapter and the last, any such view is doomed to failure. It 
is impossible to have a conception of truth while assuming our concepts or our reality are 
fundamentally falsified. This failure leaves untouched Nietzsche's actual (correct) view of 
perspectivism, the version of perspectivism that embraces commonsense and scientific truth, but 
denies metaphysical truth. 
With Nietzsche's mature view of perspectivism finally understood, we have achieved a 
powerful new tool for understanding Nietzsche and his rather cryptic writings. Perspectivism 
allows us to understand several basic assumptions of the later Nietzsche and explore why these 
assumptions were made. If Nietzsche were only concerned with epistemology, then perhaps the 
story could end there. However, Nietzsche dedicated his understanding of epistemology to the 
service of understanding values and the much more important issue of how new values can be 
created. In the next chapter, I will examine some of Nietzsche's larger philosophy through the 
lens of perspectivism to see if some other obscurities in his philosophy can be understood.  
lviii
Chapter  3
Nietzsche on Perspectivism and Value
Much of Nietzsche’s philosophy is concerned with value: what value is, where value 
comes from and where value is going. This concern is motivated by Nietzsche's conviction that 
Western Civilization is in the middle of a crisis of value; the old values on which the western 
world had been built had been undermined but no new values had been created to replace them. 
The symptom as well as the end result of this crisis is nihilism, and much of Nietzsche's 
philosophy can be seen as a counter attack against the threat of nihilism. This is a hugely 
complicated issue, one that interlaces with practically all of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and as such 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this chapter will focus on a specific issue in 
Nietzsche's fight against nihilism, the issue of Nietzsche's perspectivism with regard to value. 
Now that we have examined Nietzsche's later theory of perspectivism with regard to truth, we 
can apply it to those problems of value Nietzsche thought were  important. Furthermore, we can 
show how Nietzsche's perspectivism with regard to values don't fall prey to the skepticism and 
nihilism that he saw spreading in western culture. 
According to Nietzsche, nihilism is caused by the fading of the values in our society that 
used to be paramount, that is, the loss of belief in the existence of absolute values. Nietzsche 
understood absolute values as the claims to truth of religion, objective metaphysical truth, and 
what we will call ascetic values. Ascetic values are, broadly, values that take their authority from 
another world or reality. Nietzsche’s most famous statement ‘God is dead’ did not only proclaim 
the absence of God in the world; it also proclaimed the death of ascetic values. Ascetic values are 
explicitly non-perspectival in that they are grounded in the existence and superiority of a realm 
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independent of human perspective, something like the Thing-in-Itself or, at least, an objective 
reality serving as a foundation for truth. The connection between these religious values and non-
perspectival truth is appeal to other worlds, be it the relatively straightforward other world of 
heaven or a perspective humans cannot achieve, such as “objectivity” in the metaphysical sense. 
Nietzsche took Plato's world of the forms to be the paradigmatic example of this but claimed that 
philosophers and other thinkers throughout history have been seduced by the appeal of ascetic 
forms of thinking. The statement ‘God is dead’ proclaims an end to not just religious explanation 
but to all objective value.30. 
Without these ascetic values, Nietzsche feared, society would grow increasingly aimless 
and self destructive31, eventually culminating in nihilism for higher people32. Nietzsche’s early 
skepticism with regard to truth can be seen as Nietzsche following the metaphysics of truth to its 
logical conclusion.33 We have seen in the discussion of the last chapter how Nietzsche’s mature 
perspectivism refutes Nietzsche's earlier skepticism, allowing ordinary kinds of truth and value. 
But while Nietzsche's later philosophy rules out the kind of skepticism and relativism underlying 
30 I will italicize “objective” in the phrase “objective value” (“objective morality”, and so on) as a short hand for 
value metaphysically grounded in an otherworldly absolute, the sort of objectivity Nietzsche rejected. This will 
indicate its difference from ordinary, non-metaphysical, common-sense objectivity  that simply contrasts with the 
subjective.
31 Ascetic values provide positive visions of the world to work toward, as well as providing interpretations for 
suffering. Without these two interpretations, Nietzsche thought the western world would find existence not only 
pointless, but unbearable, and hence turn to nihilism. 
32 I beg the reader's forbearance, as here I use this term without defining it. I will be discussing higher people later 
in the chapter.
33 Notice how this also renders intelligible Nietzsche's criticisms of truth in Birth of Tragedy where he noted how 
science was undermining the beliefs that made life worth living. 
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nihilism, the pragmatism that produces this result  shuts the door once and for all on the old 
ascetic values. While the problem of truth has been sorted, the problem of values is still in play. 
The problem of values, then, is much like the problem of truth discussed in the previous two 
chapters. We can have truth understood in perspectivism, though it specifically forbids objective 
truth. The same is true of value.34  
With that project in mind, we first must fully explain why these objective values fail, 
particularly objective moral truth. Objective moral truth fails for the same reasons objective truth 
fails: it assumes a claim to knowledge that is impossible, or at the very least, impossible for 
humans to know. Thus, perspectivism, examined in the last chapter, forbids objective moral truth, 
just as it forbids objective truth. It is important to see that Nietzsche is not criticizing morality by 
claiming that people never act ‘morally’, that is, in accordance with one moral system or another; 
rather, he claims objective moral actions could never have a rational foundation. Because of this, 
Nietzsche often uses the word ‘morality’ in a rather extended sense. There are other, broader 
systems Nietzsche would classify as ‘moralistic’ because perspectivism would ultimately take 
issue with them. Logical positivism is a good example since it proposes that one can discover the 
‘final theory’ of science, of which all other science is just a subset.  As noted in the last chapter, 
perspectivism forbids this because such knowledge would be foundational in the metaphysically 
pernicious sense Nietzsche has identified as problematic. 
34 Nietzsche's pragmatism here parts company with the developments in classical American Pragmatism, which 
was pervaded by a broad social optimism grounded in an alignment with the productive forces of American science 
and industrialism. This difference may have something to do with the very different role of religion in America in 
the 19th century.  Because many of the Europeans who came the new world had fled because of the persecution of 
their own forms of Protestantism by established state religions, religion was at once more immediately personal and 
at the same time barred from receiving the authority of the state.
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It is important for us to understand why these moral and metaphysical ideas fail, since if 
Nietzsche wants to create a viable alternative to such schemes, Nietzsche's values must avoid the 
problems of which he is critical. Nietzsche is proposing a value scheme incompatible with both 
absolutism and nihilism. Nihilism says that the only rational position upon discovering the 
failure of absolute truth is to believe in nothing. Although Nietzsche spent much of his career 
arguing against that idea and advocating what he thought were better types of values, the better 
values he championed must be understood in sharp contrast to the objective absolutist values 
both he and the nihilist rejected.
This point is simple but potentially confusing to the uncritical reader of Nietzsche's 
works. Nietzsche does not seek to deny all forms of value and then declare what is real value. 
That is, he does not want to criticize all morality and then advocate his own particular brand of 
morality. Nietzsche does not want to make his own morality by which everyone must abide nor 
does he deny the possibility of value. The problem here is that the term ‘morality’ (and, by 
extension, ‘value’) is often applied differently by different people. 
Nietzsche wanted to deny what we have called objective morality, that is, any sort of 
morality claimed to be metaphysically objective or absolute. He also wanted to deny virtues and 
values—what  we will refer to as objective virtue—that were formulated the same way as 
objective morality.35 However, at no point does Nietzsche want to deny the possibility of good 
virtues for a people or an individual, or the utility of moral concepts. 
35 An example of this move is discussed in Twilight as the second great error: “The most general formula on which 
every religion and morality is founded is: 'Do this and that, refrain from this and that --- and you will be happy! 
Otherwise...'” [pg #]
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This last point is often lost on those moral philosophers who assume that objective 
morality is true or that virtue must be objective virtue in order to be real. These people typically 
think morality must be objective morality if we are to avoid nihilism, and since nihilism is 
obviously false, objective morality must exist. I mention this because these philosophers muddy 
the water considerably when talking about morality; specifically, they inevitably refer to 
Nietzsche as a 'moral nihilist' because he denies the existence of objective morality or say that 
Nietzsche denies all virtue because he denies objective virtue. They forget that Nietzsche thought 
virtue existed, just not objective virtue, and there is a difference between denying objective virtue 
and denying virtue altogether. This brief discussion is meant to clarify what I write later in this 
chapter. For example say, by way of criticism, that something is an objective moral form of 
reasoning, I am referring to the particular sense of “moral” under examination, rather than 
denying the possibility of unselfish action. Nietzsche never denies the possibility of virtue or 
the utility of morality; rather, he wants to note the rational impossibility of objective morality and 
the empirical impossibility of objective virtue. 
That said, we can now examine why objective morality and objective virtue fail. Consider 
objective morality. The argument against objective morality is a simple consequence of the truth 
of perspectivism. Objective morality is ruled out by perspectivism because this philosophy 
assumes objective truth in the form of objective moral facts.  These facts are much like the 
objective truth examined in the last chapter. They are truths, but somehow ‘disinterested’ or 
‘unconditioned’ truths.  Some philosophers have recently taken a different tack than mere appeal 
to the self-evidence of the tradition to overcome the challenge of perspectivism. The search has 
now taken on a scientific veneer. Advocates of the moral scientific approach portray the search 
for objective moral facts as being much like any other scientific inquiry.  Let us hypothetically 
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grant that these objective moral facts exist. These facts, then, are not like the other facts about us; 
they are imposing and unignorable in human conduct and are true for all people, regardless of 
perspective. If they are imposing and unignorable in human conduct in the ways a moralist 
would insist upon, then, for example, a marketing firm could not use those principles to sell 
things because they are not like other psychological principles. An agent with a different 
perspective could not view these moral facts as something to overcome. If objective moral facts 
are to do the work moralists need them to do, then the object of this so-called scientific enquiry 
turns from finding out ordinary facts, such as ‘humans have an appendix’ which is useful or not 
depending on context, to these very strange one-dimensional facts that only have one possible 
interpretation. And as we have seen, facts which have only one possible interpretation are ruled 
out by perspectivism because facts are used in a perspective, and the meaning of those facts is 
determined at least in part by the perspective in question.
Objective Virtue is a more thorny moral issue. On the one hand, Nietzsche clearly and 
frequently advocates certain values; he obviously thought that there were many good virtues. On 
the other, the concept of virtue is frequently attacked by him for being mere morals and 
metaphysics. This seeming contradiction can be puzzling to the casual Nietzsche reader. The key 
to solving this problem is to understand that objective virtues are commonly preached as not in a 
perspective; rather, they are either (1) considered useful to all persons regardless of their 
perspective (a claim criticized in the section above) or (2) seen as always being effective in the 
same way.36 Both uses of the concept of values are objectionable to Nietzsche, though Nietzsche 
is not opposed to the concept of values altogether for he has many positive values to advocate.
36 For example, consider the dubious claim that ‘the people with the positive attitude always get the best jobs’ or ‘if 
you work hard, you will be successful.’ By effective, I mean that performing the behaviour faithfully makes the 
outcome a certainty, and not just more likely. 
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In case (1), virtue assumes the objective view already criticized. By way of defence, an 
advocate of this view might say that these values are Omniperspectival rather than objective. 
That is, they encompass all perspectives, much like Schacht's view criticized in the last chapter. 
Omniperspectivism functions in the same way as objective truth; it presents facts as 
disinterested, irrefutable, or binding regardless of perspective. Under perspectivism, however, 
facts or values are made useful in the context of  one perspective, among perspectives different 
from one another. The omniperspectivalists argue that underneath the subjective perspective 
there is a universal one, but universal, in this case, means once again objective, without interest, 
since such a view is necessarily divorced from the more recognizable perspectivism. 
Omniperspectivism assumes that we are fundamentally all the same, and this sameness grounds a 
master perspective which supports whatever values the omniperspectivist wishes to advocate. In 
the end, though, it is a misuse of the concept of perspectivism to argue for the objective.
Case (2) concerns the other form of objectionable virtue, the claim that some acts or 
virtues are always causal (or effective) in the same way. In essence, Nietzsche thought there were 
no guarantees as far as actions went, simply because the success of X action resulting in Y 
ignored the world’s chaotic nature.37 One can choose one’s actions with a great deal of control, 
but one cannot choose the results of those actions. The view that action X will always result in Y 
is a moralistic one, since it turns the human will38 into a magically causal force that somehow 
trumps all other causal forces. For example, if we use the virtue of positive thinking as an 
37 This is meant as a criticism of models of people's actions in the world, not a criticism of causality itself. 
38 Another idea Nietzsche found objectionable; we will keep it here just for clarity. Nietzsche was completely 
opposed to the idea of the human will as a casa sui, an uncaused cause. BGE 21 makes it clear that Nietzsche had no 
use for the free will as any sort of metaphysical concept. 
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example of something that guarantees success (let's say, get a job), then somehow the act of 
thinking positively would have to have a greater causal force than, say, living in the Great 
Depression. The success of human actions is never certain; uncertainty and risk can never be 
removed as factors because there are forces in the world that are not under our control.39 The 
human will is one force among many and certainly not the strongest force in the universe. 
However, virtue theory in a moralistic formulation must offer this sort of certainty, since this 
certainty is the initial selling point of the theory. What makes objective morality and virtue 
attractive to the decadent is the guarantees offered and an escape from this uncertain world of 
ours. 
Another objectionable formulation of an objective virtue, according to Nietzsche, would 
be ‘it would be best40 if everyone were to do X’ (i.e., act in the same way). By now we have dealt 
with this argument as a form of underhanded objectivism, but there is an additional point to be 
made, one that meshes with the point on virtue. This third moralistic idea assumes that everyone 
is the same, having not only the same interests but also the same capabilities. Nietzsche strongly 
39 Most moralists would not argue with this; but a certain formulation of morality implicitly if not explicitly 
assumes this type of control; any theory that cites bootstraps is guilty of this. For example, libertarian ideas about 
total individual responsibility results in the claim that if we give people no support whatsoever, they will shape up 
and become completely responsible for themselves. This is not qualified by ‘assuming certain socioeconomic 
conditions exist.’ The assumption on the part of the libertarian is explicitly rooted in humanity having free will in the 
casa sui sense that Nietzsche found so objectionable, with the additional assumption that the human will can always 
trump fortune and circumstance: “Here I simply supply the psychology of all 'making responsible'” (TI The four 
great errors, 7).
40 Notice how ‘best’ is another judgement that only works in a perspective; the values in “best” in this case are often 
just assumed to be the good, be it independence, the true spirit of Marxism, or wealth.
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disagrees with this idea41 because he sees humanity as having different capabilities as well as 
different interests. This is not only a matter of perspectivism, but also a fact about humanity in 
general. This idea is important and will be explored later. 
In Nietzsche’s project, one set of values will not be binding on everyone because 
perspectivism recognizes that what is a useful value to one is useless, even dangerous, to others. 
Although this is partly a consequence of Nietzsche's arguments against perspectivism, it is also 
clear from Nietzsche's writings that he takes the variability of human beings to be empirically 
determinable. Consider that all objective moral systems, from an openly moral system like 
Christianity to a pseudo- moral system like Libertarianism, must assume a universal set of values 
on which to judge people either by saying ‘this is right’ or ‘this is best regardless’. Without such 
a set of values, the act of praising and condemning cannot be applied to everyone, and 
inconsistency would take away most of the value of the system to its practitioners.42 
Perspectivism tells us that what is useful in a perspective depends on the values and the holder of 
the perspective, ruling out any unitary perspective such as this. Nietzsche wants to make the 
point that values will be useful in a perspective, and not objectively universalizable43 to all 
people.
41 For example, Nietzsche's criticism of democracy in BGE 201 has the values of the herd smothering any type of 
person who does not conform with the values of the herd. This is but one example of one “type” being seen as the 
only rational ideal doing damage to other people who do not fit the ideal. 
42 “Christianity is the metaphysics of the hangman” (TI The four great errors, 7).
43 Of course there is an ordinary hypothetical sense of ‘universality’ which remains and  is simply a consequence of 
the identity of indiscernables. Anything that is good (required, right) for you must equally be good (required, right) 
for anyone else who is relevantly similar. This is the sense of universality which rules out the (immoral) view that 
you are privileged or special because you are you rather than because you have some features in virtue of which it is 
good (required, right) for you .
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Another argument which Nietzsche gives as to why there is no one right way for 
everyone to behave is that any theory that does assume objectively universalizable behaviour 
must assume a very strange (indeed, impossible) sort of person. The theory must assume we are 
identical in our background, situation and sometimes even our physiologies. By concealing or 
overlooking the differences in people, the theory gives advice that may well be disastrous rather 
than good for people. Nietzsche gives as an example Cornarism in Twilight of the Idols. Cornaro 
wrote a diet book, his slender diet, giving the recipe for his long and happy life, namely, eating 
very little. Nietzsche argues that  Cornaro has actually confused his cause and effect. Cornaro 
lived a long life due to his extraordinary slow metabolism which, in turn, meant that he had to eat 
much less than most: “He was not free to eat little or too much; his frugality was not a matter of 
“free will”: he became sick when he ate more” (TI, The four great errors, 1). Thus, those with 
high metabolisms trying the same diet would cause themselves great harm; only people like 
Cornaro in the relevant ways can act like him and get a benefit. We can understand this potential 
damage as a failure to understand perspectivism. Judgements about what is good and bad must 
be made in a context, and when the advice concerns the actions of people, it must consider what 
kind of capacities they have and what they are capable of.44 
44 One interesting comparison we could make here is to Aristotle’s Golden Mean. On  Aristotle's account,  what is 
right for some people (moderate eating) is too little for some (wrestlers.) This, I think, would appeal to Nietzsche 
since it bases what is good directly on the individual. On the other hand, the Golden Mean is about balancing 
passions, which Nietzsche saw as a mark of decadence. Nietzsche thought drives had to be harnessed and put into an 
order of rank, not perpetually at equilibrium. By harnessing the drives and sublimating weaker drives into stronger 
ones, there could be growth and strength. In contrast, peace between the drives,  with self-preservation as the highest 
value, lead inevitably to decline and decadence. So the Golden Mean was,  for  Nietzsche,  closer to the truth than 
many other theories of virtue, but fell short of the mark. 
lxviii
Human capacities (intellectual, physical, and so on) differ much like perspectives differ. 
What is good and useful for one person is bad or useless for another, depending on these 
capacities. When giving advice to someone and adopting values, one must consider the person as 
well as what interests him or her. The differences in the capabilities different people have are 
caused by contingent factors like experience and genetics. Nietzsche acts as a good example of 
this in action since, in Ecce Homo, he attributes his philosophical breakthroughs to the help 
given him by his illness: “It should be noted: it was during the years of my lowest vitality that I 
ceased to be a pessimist; the instinct of self-restoration forbade me a philosophy of poverty and 
discouragement” (EH, 2).  
Personal identity is made up of a set of definite traits which makes one good for one role 
but unsuitable for another. The lack of certain abilities leads to the development of certain others 
which may, in the long run, be more useful than those lacking. Nietzsche, for example, would 
make a poor soldier, because his physical weakness would leave him at a severe disadvantage in 
a melee, but thanks to his illness, he had time to read, making him very good at textual 
interpretation. Here, ‘what is good’ happens in a perspective, and it is only the situations 
individuals find themselves in that determine if they are good warriors as opposed to good 
thinkers. The idea of what is good for one is bad for another may seem strange to the reader, 
since Nietzsche is always advocating a certain set of values. And the values he advocates are not 
always obvious, for example the value of risking oneself for goals,45 or how conflict can be a 
way of strengthening oneself,46 or advocating that if one is to learn to love life, one must 
recognize that pain and uncertainty are facts one cannot change. So the reader can reasonably ask 
45 “What makes one heroic? -- Going out to meet at the same time one's highest suffering and one's highest hope” 
(GS 268).
46 “From life's school of war: what does not kill me makes me stronger” (TI, maxims, 8).
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how this view escapes contradiction if what is good for one is bad for another.47
This is not a contradiction of Nietzsche's view. One must recognize that Nietzsche's 
values are intended not for the whole world, but for Nietzsche’s audience of “higher people”. In 
Nietzsche's perspective, there are fundamentally two types of people in the world—higher and 
lower people.48 This distinction is paramount to understanding Nietzsche's positive philosophy 
since it explains both how Nietzsche's positive values are not moralistic and for whom these 
values were intended. Nietzsche wrote exclusively for higher people and targeted his philosophy 
only to them. 
The distinction between a higher person and lower people is a kind of idealization, like 
Aristotle's person of practical wisdom. What it comes down to is simply the ability to choose a 
hard truth over an easy illusion. Nietzsche thought that in practice, most people lived their lives 
using illusion rather than truth, and most were incapable of being honest with themselves. The 
story and reasoning behind this belief will occupy the rest of the chapter. The main point is that 
lower people, not placing a particularly high value on truth, can get their values from anywhere, 
including the old forms of value that are passing away, but higher people must base their values 
on truth. These new values will be perspectival, and must not be objective morality or virtue to 
be successful. This sort of ‘A, not A’ division is important to Nietzsche because his entire 
philosophical project is directed toward these higher people, and Nietzsche's main interest is in 
47 This is as good a place as any to remind the reader that though Nietzsche criticized objective moral values 
extensively and criticized many other types of values as well, Nietzsche did not think all values were a waste of 
time. Such a conclusion would be nihilistic, and one that Nietzsche explicitly denies with his positive philosophy. 
48 In an ambiguity typical of Nietzsche's style, he uses “higher” and “lower” and “stronger and weaker” 
interchangeably. 
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the creation and strengthening of this higher type. 49
Nietzsche thought most people better off in practice with their illusions because the truth 
of matters was often more than they could bear. Nietzsche, in advocating his values, is not 
interested in giving advice to everyone; his concern is only to give advice to people who are 
capable of surviving and even flourishing in the light of the hard reality of truth. He believed that 
without such people, society is doomed to slip further into decadence; consequently, he is 
advocating and is concerned about the creation of “higher” people. Higher people are defined by 
Nietzsche as “strong” individuals but, here, ‘strength’ has the very specific meaning of having 
the ability to choose a hard truth over an easy illusion. This truth is not selected because truth is 
good “in itself.”50 Rather, it serves in the pursuit of goals and makes the individual more effective 
in the world. This is also the reason why higher people (according to Nietzsche's view) will 
reject all moral and religious interpretations. Religious interpretations offer merely feelings of 
effectiveness, and not real world effectiveness. The second and third point I wish to make about 
Nietzsche's values is that they are intended for the few, not the many, and the cornerstone for 
these values is Nietzsche's dedication to truth. 
Perhaps one of the odder truths about Nietzsche’s philosophy is that despite scathing (in 
the Antichrist, bordering on shrill) criticism of Christianity, he thought that most people were 
better off with their illusions, Christian or otherwise. Despite his criticisms, Nietzsche never 
denied the usefulness of these illusions for seducing people back to life and allowing them to 
continue living. Like many subjects close to Nietzsche’s heart, he is both respectful and scornful 
49 BGE 203.
50 GM III offers an extended critique of the idea that the truth is an objective good. Ultimately, such a belief is seen 
as the latest expression of the ascetic ideal which looks for “unlimited” goods. 
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of religion.  Consider, as an example, a pregnant teenager with no one to turn to but a youth 
minister who offers her a place in the local church. Regardless of the truth of the existence of 
God, she may be better off joining the church, both for the real community within it (as opposed 
to the atomized society from which she comes) and for the positive effect of believing that there 
is a big irresistible force of a big guy in the sky who is, furthermore, in her corner. This can be a 
powerful and empowering belief, especially for one whom society has abandoned. Nietzsche 
criticized constantly the idea that truth was somehow the best thing (see, for example, the entire 
third essay of GM). Truth in the pregnant teenager’s case would at best achieve nothing, at worst 
drive her straight into the abyss.
The philosophical reader might ask why Nietzsche didn’t advocate that everyone should 
think like higher people. There are two reasons for this. First, saying that people should be 
something other than they are is the sign of resentment, something Nietzsche wanted to utterly 
purge from his new way of thinking. The facts of higher and lower people are true, and nothing 
he could do could change this particular aspect of the world, as inconvenient as it is for one 
theory or another. The second reason is more complicated and has to do with the contradiction of 
weak wills. Much like more mundane capacities that are not up to us, such as the ability to be six 
feet tall or have a good education, the strength to pick truth under discussion here is an ability 
not given to everyone. Further, despite strength being genetically undetermined, Nietzsche 
realized the terrible paradox of strength, that beneath a certain level of strength, people were 
incapable of choosing strength. Weak persons desire to be strong but, due to their weakness, are 
unable to steel themselves and pick truth over a pleasant illusion. They cannot build this capacity 
since to choose strength requires it. So they are left as they are—weak:  “First principle – one 
must need to be strong, otherwise one will never become strong” (TI, What Germans Lack, 38). 
Contingent circumstances (i.e., factors beyond their control) could conceivably bring it about 
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that they come to have the discipline and strength of will to choose truth over illusion, but unless 
that determination and discipline is initially there, the individual cannot will it into existence. 
Nietzsche advocated strong individuals because his analysis of recent history led him to the view 
that modern industrial-democratic society encouraged the formation of weak rather than strong 
individuals, and indeed, openly preferred them. This institutional weakness was in danger of 
infecting higher people who had strong character values. 51
Much of Nietzsche’s criticism of democracy, of rights, and of the values of the herd can 
be seen through this perspective. The values of the herd (that is to say, the values of Christian-
democratic society) were hostile to strongly expressed individuals. Indeed, a genealogy of the 
herd’s values, according to Nietzsche, show that they advocate values which are more useful to 
the herd than to the individual.52  
We need to address the question of why Nietzsche emphasises effectiveness. Why does 
Nietzsche think effectiveness is or should be the cornerstone of higher people’s interests? The 
answer involves Nietzsche's perspectivism. Before laying out the answer, I must briefly explain 
two ideas, Nietzsche’s concept of the Will to Power and order of rank, underpinning his 
perspectivism. 
51 See GM, Section 12, for more discussion. This hostility against strongly expressed types was one reason behind 
Nietzsche's contempt for democracy. Nietzsche  felt this hiostility was motivated by the same hostility to stronger 
characters that motivated Christianity. See also BGE 201.
52 This also offers insight into the intended audience for Nietzsche’s philosophical project. If the great mass of 
people continue to believe whatever is pleasant to them regardless of reason eroding those values, then the rational 
death of those values should not be a concern. To the herd, it isn’t. However, to the higher man, it is, as his very 
existence is based upon valuing truth over pleasantness. 
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The Will to Power is too large a subject to deal with in full, in part because there is 
considerable disagreement among Nietzsche scholars on this topic. Fortunately for our purposes, 
to bring the Will to Power to bear on Nietzsche’s philosophy as I’ve described it in this chapter, 
we must dispense with most interpretations, particularly cosmological interpretations of the Will 
to Power. The Cosmological Will to Power (for the reader's reference) could be summarized as 
the idea that that the entire world, even inanimate objects, can be reduced to a striving force or an 
attempt by one force to dominate another. Cosmological interpretations of the Will to Power are 
often explicitly metaphysical or objectively true in nature since they are either a priori theorizing 
or the “final truth” underlying reality.  If Nietzsche holds either view, then it is a major 
inconstancy, if the reader agrees with my interpretation. Nietzsche only once discusses the Will 
to Power in the published works, in Beyond Good and Evil 36. Maudemarie Clarke argues that 
this appearance of the cosmological will to power is not to argue or advocate it; rather, Nietzsche 
includes it as a cautionary example of what he would argue if he made the same mistakes that 
many other philosophers make (Clarke 218). In keeping with our interpretative rule of viewing 
the published works as more important than the Nachless, it seems the cosmological will to 
power can be safely ignored. 
Minus cosmological formulations, the Will to Power can be seen as a psychological 
theory, one about what underlies our actions. Kaufmann's interpretation of the will to power is 
closer to what we are looking for, since Kaufmann is explicitly psychological and rejects the 
cosmological theory of the will to power as something that “need not be taken seriously, even in 
an effort to understand Nietzsche”(Kaufmann 510).  Kaufmann interprets the Will to Power as 
the ultimate motivation behind all human action.  In contrast to Darwinists of Nietzsche’s time 
who thought that life was essentially survival, Kaufmann argues that the desire for power, desire 
for growth or desire for increase in strength makes more sense as the drive behind life: 
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“Whatever is wanted is wanted for the sake of power” (Kaufmann 511). All our individual 
desires and actions underlie our desire for power. This interpretation has definite advantages. It 
turns the Will to Power into a psychological (and hence empirical) principle and it fits with most 
of Nietzsche's published discussions of the Will to Power.   For instance, Nietzsche frequently 
discusses the slave revolt in morals as being driven by the Will to Power, much as those people's 
initial oppression was driven by the Will to Power. 
The Will to Power on Kaufmann's account, then, is a meta-motive, one that underlies 
such diverse activity as Viking raids, religious activity, and thesis writing. While Kaufmann can 
(and does) explain much in Nietzsche's philosophy with his formulation of the Will to Power, his 
account has two serious problems. First, this interpretation makes the Will to Power a 
foundational truth, as least as far as psychology is concerned. It is a final view that explains all of 
human behaviour and thus is anathema to the perspectivist reading of Nietzsche I've been 
expounding. Second, if the Will to Power is a motive that ultimately underpins all human action, 
it explains nothing. For a motive or cause to make sense as an explanation, it must be necessarily 
contrasted with other causes. If what motivates me to complete this thesis is a sense of wanting 
to redeem all the time spent working on it, then that is a very different motive from wanting to 
complete it because I have high hopes of going on to a doctoral program. Insight into my 
motivation is lost if the only permissible motive is a pursuit of power. Then my action of 
completing a thesis is a pursuit of power, much in the same way as readers are reading it for 
power. If all our motives are the same, then we have reduced motives to an 'empty phrase' to use 
Clarke's term, even if we have not reduced motive to teleology. 
Though it is ultimately an unworkable interpretation, Kaufmann is on the right track. 
Nietzsche was one of the first thinkers to think of human psychology as a series of natural drives, 
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and the Will to Power, based on his comments, seems to be a drive which he attributes to many 
different types of activity, from the Greeks to, oddly, the ascetic priest (BG 51). The 
interpretation of the Will to Power I think is correct is Maudemarie Clark's view that the Will to 
Power is a   second order desire, one that desires effectiveness.53 This is defined by Clark as the 
improvement of “one’s ability to satisfy one’s first order will” (Clark 229). First order wills are 
those desires such as the ability to feel secure in a community or the desire to finish a thesis. This 
interpretation keeps Kaufmann's commitment to explaining the Will to Power in empirical and 
psychological terms, but makes the Will to Power consistent with Nietzsche's larger pragmatism 
This interpretation of the Will to Power does not run afoul of the objections we have made 
against Kaufmann's formulation. Firstly, the Will to Power, on Clark's account, becomes a drive 
among others; consequently, motives like greed or pity do not become various manifestations of 
a single drive. Clark's formulation also avoids implicit foundationalism, since it is to be thought 
of as just another psychological drive, one that is highly useful in understanding people, but in 
the end, is just another psychological drive.  What desires we seek to satisfy as opposed to others 
is decided in the context of the higher person's goals. This account can also connect the Will to 
Power to Nietzsche's account of higher people. 
Just as we seek to satisfy our first order desires (success, financial security, even food and 
sex), we strive for feelings of effectiveness in our world. However, it is feelings of effectiveness 
that the Will to Power is satisfied by, not necessarily effectiveness in the real world. This is why 
much of human action could be explained through that perspective of the Will to Power. For 
example, a primitive tribe making a sacrifice to the rain god generates feelings of control and 
effectiveness on events beyond the people’s control. This is also how Nietzsche deconstructs 
53 This section, due to space constraints, is somewhat brief; for a more detailed explanation, please see Clark's 
book, starting on p 211. 
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much of what lies underneath Christianity. Christianity gives feelings of control and 
effectiveness over life itself, even when that effectiveness is based on devaluing life. As we will 
see, this also sheds light on a further confusion in Nietzsche. It will clarify why religions were 
seen as motivated by Will to Power when Nietzsche often claimed his own philosophy was also 
motivated by Will to Power. 
As an example, consider someone concerned about global warming who buys a hybrid 
car. Hybrid cars get slightly better mileage than comparable subcompacts and emit slightly less, 
but only slightly less than entirely mundane subcompacts and compacts that have been on sale 
for years. Yet the buyer (we’ll call her Beth) gets a feeling of making an important contribution 
because cars are often demonized as the main source of pollution, despite the fact that all 
transportation emissions (including Transport trucks, planes, and ships) account for only 14% of 
total greenhouse gas emissions,54 and restrictions on automotive emissions have become much 
stricter since 1966.55 A person who wanted to move this concern beyond feelings might choose to 
move from the suburbs (Beth still lives there and has to drive 40 minutes to work each day) or 
create political initiatives that would have an effect much greater than driving a hybrid. They 
might get the city they live in to adopt an ordinance for evaporation-proof gas cans, adopt some 
sort of emissions regulations for small engines, or even get the city to enforce emissions laws on 
commercial vehicles. This feeling of effectiveness for lower people is always preferable to 
effective action in the real world because it satisfies the need lower people have for feelings of 
effectiveness. Thus, Beth can feel she is effectively lessening global warming (and condemn 
everyone who does not have a hybrid) while actually doing very little. The Hybrid car is 
54 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Greenhouse_Gas_by_Sector.png
55 The LEV (Low Emitting vehicle) standard emits 93% less then a pre-regulation vehicle, and the new SULEV 
(super ultra low emitting vehicle) standard is 94% cleaner than an LEV. 
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analogous to objective moral practice in that it gives a feeling of effectiveness without actually 
changing much of anything. Since the higher person is always concerned with effectiveness, this 
motive gives him a reason to reject one practise in favour of something else. Nietzsche's higher 
people, to drive the point home, will look for real world effectiveness, for what will best help 
them accomplish their projects (in this case, reduce global warming) and not be distracted by 
feelings of effectiveness. They are concerned with effectiveness in fact.
This is why the Will to Power is described as the path “to fundamental problems” (BGE 
23).  Once religion is exposed by it in terms of this world effectiveness, the reason behind 
religion is undermined, the underlying deemphasizing of control over this world and an 
emphasizing of the ultimate greater importance of the next – alas, completely imaginary - world. 
By exposing religion's failure to gain ‘this world’ effectiveness, Nietzsche removes the 
motivation behind it, the attempt to devalue this world. The religious practitioner cannot say he 
practises religion for this world effectiveness because religion derives its power from devaluing 
this world and valuing another one. Positing the motivation for religion as ‘this worldly’ 
undermines the initial motivation. Consequently, even the lower person can be motivated by the 
Will to Power because those feelings of effectiveness need not ever intersect with the real 
world.56 And this raises a question which will return us to the subject of Nietzsche's positive 
philosophy, the question of why the higher person is different. The Higher person’s Will to 
Power is tempered by the Will to Truth, the desire to know the truth no matter how unpleasant it 
is. This will to truth is adopted ultimately because, as already said, truth is useful to pursuing 
dreams and goals in the real world. This returns us to why there is a focus on effectiveness. It 
56 See how many people support the war on terror or the Iraq war because it gives them feelings of safety or 
strength, despite the fact that the Iraq War accomplishes the opposite. 
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appears that the answer is relatively simple; since people with a dedicated will to truth57 can’t 
believe in the old ascetic and religious values anymore, they need a new source for values and a 
new source of interpretations for suffering58. The answer Nietzsche gives for higher individuals is 
another important point about Nietzsche's positive values, one that meshes once again with 
perspectivism. These new interpretations and values, the things that make life worth living, 
higher individuals get from themselves, from their own personal dreams and goals. Working 
toward dreams and goals has two effects—it provides an order of rank and it dictates what 
things, even values, are useful to the individual and what are not. 
We now need to explain Order of rank, another bit of necessary Nietzsche-speak. Drives, 
whichever one's they might be, are urges seeking expression. Since we have many different 
drives and many different types of urges, some are mutually exclusive; they must fight for 
dominance.59 These drives are the product of our animal prehistory: “they are a vast confusion of 
contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives” (WTP, 259). These drives 
constantly strive for expression or satiation, and these drives act as Elixir Vitae for individuals, 
since they underpin action and drive the individual forward. The individual acts as a container 
for these drives, though the individual has some control over what drives are expressed and 
57 Will to Truth, in Nietzsche, means a desire for truth, no matter how unpleasant. As we have seen, this is the 
defining characteristic of the higher person.
58 Interpretations for suffering is possibly the most important purpose of religion and ascetic values since it offers a 
very powerful framework for giving meaning to suffering, thus making it bearable. For example, the suffering of 
being a slave in the Roman Empire was made bearable by the thought that once the Christian dies, he will be 
rewarded and his oppressors punished. Nietzsche's values for the higher person (as we shall see) must also be able to 
make this sort of interpretation, as giving meaning to suffering is one of the primary purposes of values. 
59 This view is similar to Freud's view in that Freud views the individual as a bundle of drives. Unlike Freud, 
however, Nietzsche thought that these drives were not reducible to any primal drives, such as sex. 
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which are sublimated. On Nietzsche’s account, in a weak individual no drives have dominance 
and one impulse fights another for domination. Because of this civil war of the drives, the 
individual cannot use the energy and power contained within. The lowest kind of individual is, 
then, the wanton—the creature who is completely ruled by its present drives and simply does 
whatever its drives dictate. 
However, with an overriding perspective as to what a goal should be, this jumble of 
drives comes to have a clear order of priority, an order of rank. Its priority is determined by the 
individual's goals and dreams, and the concrete things that need to be done in order to achieve 
them.  With this order of rank of the drives, the individual can control what affects are useful to 
the situation or, as Nietzsche put it, “here the co-ordination of the inner systems and their 
operation in the service of one end is best achieved” (WP 778).
It seems we have drifted far away from perspectivism, but this theory of the unity of 
drives explains how values work in a perspective. This highest drive works toward a goal, and 
values are generated from this perspective. Thus, what a person does becomes not a constant 
swirl of distractions and things to do but a clear path as to what must be done. In other words, 
drives and goals create the perspective for the individual to choose and create his own values. 
This works not only with actions, but also for values. For example, if an individual wants to go 
to medical school, she will need a university degree beforehand; if she wants to effect change in 
a political system, she will need to first become politically influential.  
In the last chapter, we saw how a truth statement is decided in the context of a 
perspective, that any questions concerning truth must assume interests and perspectives. Values, 
too, function in the same way, especially for the higher person in that his values occur in a 
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focused perspective, in the service of an interest. What will be valuable to him will depend on his 
dreams and goals; who he is, and so on. The higher person values good and bad, not good and 
evil. The value of being able to think methodically is necessary for being a good doctor; the 
value of skepticism is necessary to be a good reporter. The person who wants to be a good 
reporter will have to turn away from the easier path of public relations and may go without a 
steady job for several years. The perspectival values that the individual adopts dictates that he 
not become a public relations flack, and provides him an interpretation for his suffering financial 
hardship. Both are necessary for becoming a good reporter. Suffering with a purpose is 
acceptable to a person, while suffering without purpose is not: “A man with a why will withstand 
any how” (TI, maxims, 12). 
Thus, the values of a higher person are much like truth statements in perspectivism. The 
correct answer to the content of a person’s goals and values depends on the context, and 
especially in the higher person, individual is the context. A value can be good enough for 
someone as long as it meets the needs of that person (much like the canary in the coal mine 
referred to in the last chapter), and what those values or methods should be depend on whether 
one is aspiring to be a pilot or finish a master’s thesis. There are right answers for these questions 
but they depend entirely on the context of the individual, the situation, and individual goals. 
Much of Nietzsche's positive philosophy is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, it has many 
definite values which Nietzsche encourages his higher people to adopt. On the other hand, these 
values are intended to make strong perspectives so that the person is free to ‘become who he is,’ 
in other words, follow his own projects, affirm his own values, and accept himself, whether good 
and bad. Nietzsche is interested in strengthening the ability of people to legislate values for 
themselves rather than in making a moral value set for everyone. This completes the sketch of 
how Nietzsche's perspectivism influences his treatment of values and contributes to his fight 
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against nihilism. But a few issues remain.
A skeptical reader might object that this contradicts Nietzsche’s criticism of the basis for 
moral values discussed earlier or might argue that this view of values is content-less since it does 
not fill in specific values. If one assumes Nietzsche had specific ideals in mind, one could 
understand this objection of ‘not leaving the picture of values half completed.’ 
First, we should consider the danger of contradiction. These values are not objective 
values obviously, since they are formed under perspectivism and apply to individuals. The truth 
of the utility of one value over another is decided by a person or type and thus is not objectively 
binding on everyone. The critic has probably anticipated this reply and will suggest instead that 
these values run afoul of perspectivism’s two other prohibitions: Either virtue is always 
rewarded, or it would be best if everyone were to do X. The former would clash with Nietzsche's 
conception of human action, and the latter would try and make humanity 'the same' in the 
objectionable way already examined. 
If adopting Nietzschean values always guaranteed success, the formula would be 
objectively moralistic virtue since it guarantees an outcome.  But Nietzsche never argues this. 
There is no guarantee that living life Nietzsche’s way will get one what one wants or will make 
one more successful; Nietzsche can only guarantee that you may not achieve your dream, but 
you will get hurt. Trying without any guarantee of success is something that only the strong 
person can accept. It is a curiously stoic notion in that actions must have their value through their 
attempt and not through their accomplishment. Nietzsche praises attempters, those who try, 
rather than those who succeed. After all, lower people succeed in getting their dreams. This will 
not satisfy those who search for the unconditional, for those who seek guarantees of success. 
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Nietzsche felt that this former approach was the most honest and thus would fit what was of 
interest to his higher people. 
The idea that everyone ought to do Nietzsche's style of thinking or philosophy is another 
idea that would be an objective virtue if Nietzsche actually thought it. But his higher/lower 
distinction clearly delineates who can and who cannot adopt these values. Once again, let us 
suppose our critic has seen that rather obvious response, and counters by noting that Nietzsche’s 
formula nonetheless applies to a subsection of people. This sub-section still involves a large class 
of people. The critic will still want to know how Nietzsche’s values avoid the same problems that 
all encompassing morality supposedly creates.
The objection falters because Nietzsche emphasizes individuality rather than singularity. 
Adoption of a value in an individual or a group, much like truth in a context, is permissible (and 
not making the 'moral mistake') because the things that make a value good or useful are spelled 
out in that context. This is what one set of values useful for everyone is missing—context. On 
Nietzsche’s account of values, the adopting of good and bad principles is modified by context, 
not based on absolutes. Nietzsche is not advocating a single type of character in his values, 
though such a misreading is somewhat common. A typical misreading would have Nietzsche 
saying that instead of being meek Christians, one should adopt the opposite values and everyone 
(or at least higher people) should be Vikings, bloodthirsty savages who loved sacking villages 
and setting afire the local priest. This cartoon portrait of Nietzsche is unfortunately rather 
common but it has no basis in Nietzsche's actual views. Nietzsche did want his higher people to 
emulate one aspect of these barbarians. As Alexander Nehamas explains, “He [Nietzsche] 
admires them primarily for their lack of absolutism, for their attitudes that it is impossible for 
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everyone to be bound by the same rules of conduct, for their “pathos of distance’”60(GM, I, 2). 
The Barbarians did not totalize their values and saw no reason for everyone to adopt their values, 
much as Nietzsche advocated his higher types doing (Nehamas, 215).
The second criticism, that of vagueness, is one common regarding Nietzsche, since 
obscurity often kept his ideas from being fully examined. If he had remained a professor, his 
style might have been different because being forced to defend his ideas would have resulted in 
clarity. His lamentable lack of clarity can be seen in this chapter with the ill-chosen terms 
“strength” and “Higher” being synonyms of one another. The charge of vagueness regarding 
Nietzsche’s values is noted by many prominent interpreters of Nietzsche. Both Danto (199) and 
Kaufmann (253) comment on this vagueness of the intention of higher values. Nehamas, in his 
discussion on this issue, goes so far as to call the superficial version of Nietzsche’s values 
“banal.” (Nehamas 221). These concerns have mostly been addressed at this point. But one or 
two further points should be made in order to round out Nietzsche’s perspectivist philosophy. 
First, Nietzsche is not vague about what values he is advocating. For strong people, he 
advocates that they strengthen their Will to Power, maintain a will to truth, develop strong 
characters, and embrace a love of fate.61 Nietzsche also advocated that people adopt or fashion 
60 “Pathos of Distance” is a term Nietzsche frequently uses, but only occasionally explains, though it is a fairly 
straightforward distinction. Nietzsche believes that healthy historical types (such as the barbarians discussed here) 
had healthier values simply because they saw their values as their own and not necessarily something that everyone 
could adopt. 
61 Also called Amor Fati by Nietzsche. There is no space for a discussion of it here. I will restrict myself to a few 
remarks. Nietzsche, as has become clear in this chapter, thought that some things were up to us and some things 
were not up to us. Robert Solomon put it this way: “that we are like the oarsmen of our fate, capable of heroic self 
movement but also swept along a sometimes cruel but open sea” (Solomon 424). If this is the case, to affirm life and 
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their own values, see those values as their own and not necessarily assume that they must be 
adopted by everyone.  Finally, he advocates understanding our own perspective at work when we 
make value judgements. In the context of an individual pursuing a goal, these values are 
concrete.
There is another reason for this lingering accusation of vagueness. Nietzsche's vagueness 
on these matters is, to some extent, deliberately vague or schematic. The reason is quite simple. 
A great individual is much like a great movie or a great work of art. If one attempts to give a 
stipulative definition of what this greatness is, one inevitably fails. The same holds true for 
individuals and their values. The concept must have a certain degree of fuzziness; otherwise, it 
becomes descriptive of particular great movies or individuals, and not greatness as a whole. The 
goal of these values makes Nietzsche a good teacher; instead of trying to impose a single type on 
everyone, these values seek to unlock an individual’s true potential in accordance with the 
individual’s inborn talents and limitations. Thus the values must remain a little vague, much as in 
perspectivism there is no way to give a single formula for universal truth. To do otherwise would 
be a violation of the perspectivism Nietzsche sought to advocate. These values are designed to 
make obvious and, more importantly, strengthen the perspectival structure that created these 
values. 
It is clear that solving the problem of truth for Nietzsche pays great dividends. Now that 
we understand Nietzsche's theory of truth as ultimately pragmatic, we can make sense of much of 
not grow resentful against it, we must affirm everything that happens to us, and hence, love fate. This affirming also 
includes accepting what we cannot control. Nietzsche in Ecce Homo is the perfect example of this in that he talks 
about the many horrible things that happened in his generally miserable life, and then affirmed them as important, 
even necessary steps in his intellectual development. 
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his positive philosophy regarding values. Perhaps, with this step, some of the debates in 
Nietzsche scholarship can finally be brought to a close. 
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